Daily Report

East Europe

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Albania: Investigators Say 26 Feb Bombing 'Political'

AU2802160796 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sources close to the investigation team set up to inquire into Monday's massacre at the Vefa supermarket that claimed four lives and injured dozens of others confirm that it has a political character. Citing these sources, today's issue of ALBANIA reports that the intensive investigations carried out so far have led to the conclusion that the launching pad for this terrorist act is Albanian. Anyway, the investigation group does not exclude the possibility of the activity of any foreign secret service, according to the newspaper, but insists that the executor of this terrorist ugly act is Albanian.

Meanwhile, sources from the Prosecutor's Office and our criminal experts have build up an identikit picture of the person who parked the bomb car at the site of the incident and the origin of the car has been discovered as well.

The investigating authorities confirm that two former employees of the infamous State Sigurimi and dozens of persons suspected of have been implicated in the event have been arrested so far.

Meanwhile, the daily KOHA JONE reacted today on the arrest of six of its employees. The Professional Journalists Association has expressed solidarity with it, considering these arrests as a provocation against the free press. However, the investigation bodies have stated that they have a mandate to investigate every person or subject suspected of being related to Monday's incident. They are currently in the phase of verifying the collected evidence, but, in the interest of the investigations, they are preserving their secrecy. However, these bodies give the hope that they will soon discover the culprits of this crime of great dimensions.

Albania: Identikit of Man Who Planted Car Bomb Issued

AU2802204396 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 28 Feb 96

[Report by Vjollca Vokshi]

[FBIS Translated Text] An identikit portrait of the person who planted the car bomb in the center of Tirana, which caused the massacre of innocent citizens, has finally been assembled thanks to persistent scientific work by domestic and foreign criminal experts. More detailed information about the identikit is provided by the Interior Ministry report.

The wanted person is about 1.75 meters tall, has an oval, brown face, short dark hair combed upwards, arched and evident eyebrows, and other regular features. At the time of the event, he was wearing a black leather jacket and black trousers.

The identikit portrait has been issued thanks to cooperation with one of the greatest experts of Italian criminology, who is renowned in Europe. He managed to assemble the portrait of the terrorist from the description provided by the supermarket guard who had spoken to the terrorist. Criminal experts say that the identikit usually provides an 80 percent match with the wanted person. In this special case, the match should be even better.

It is very difficult to get detailed information at the Interior Ministry. Everything is kept in complete secrecy. The data and detailed information are being processed behind these corridors and doors. Certain specialists say that this information differs from that published by some countries' newspapers. It has been learned that they are currently working to discover the kind of explosive that was used. Contacts with Interpol in Italy, Greece, and other European countries have been established to detain the culprit in the event of him fleeing the country. For their part, these countries have rendered their complete assurance in cooperating with us.

Albania: KOHA JONE Staff Members Detained Over Bombing

AU2902114896 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 28 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by Mentor Kikia: "Car Bomb Massacre: Ten People Detained"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tirana — More people have been detained by the police over the Tirana bomb attack. Following the detention of three former Sigurimi officers, six staff members of the newspaper KOHA JONE were detained on the premises of Police Commissariat No. 3 in Tirana yesterday. Yili Polovina, Berat correspondent for the newspaper POPULLI PO ended up in a cell. It is said that the testimony of one of the staff of the Vefa Supermarket, who is at present in the hospital, led to the detention of one of the staff of KOHA JONE, which was announced on Radio Tirana this morning. The source to which the state radio referred suspected that this very person had planted the car bomb. However, no source in the police or the Procurator's Office has confirmed this. Six KOHA JONE employees were held by the police after have been taken to the police station with the entire staff of the newspaper in the late hours of Monday night (26 Feb). The police have still not officially

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confirmed the number of those detained on suspicion of involvement in the bomb attack, although there are rumors of the detention of more former Sigurimi collaborators. [passage omitted]

Polovina was sent to the cells because of an article published in POPULLI PO months ago, with the headline "The Bombs in Skopje May Also Explode in Tirana." He was transferred during the afternoon of the day before yesterday from Berat to Tirana. Almost the entire staff of KOHA JONE were taken in for questioning. Toward midnight on Monday, they were asked by investigators when they had heard about the incident and how they had organized work to report it in the newspaper.

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Bulgaria: SDS' Stoyanov on Possible Zhelev Nomination

AU2802144496 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 26 Feb 96 p 9

[Interview with Petur Stoyanov, deputy chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces, by Valeriya Veleva; place and date not given: "If Zhelev Wins the Preliminary Elections, I Give My Word That I Will Work With Him"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Veleva] In all likelihood you will find yourself competing with Dr. Zhelev either in the preliminary elections or in the actual presidential elections. What outcome do you forecast for this duel?

[Stoyanov] I sincerely hope that the opposition will nominate a single united candidate. Dr. Zhelev cannot be an SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] candidate purely on formal grounds. His nomination would cause internal tensions that would harm the SDS, and the preservation of the union's integrity is more important than any individual. I do not regard this issue from a partisan viewpoint, but the Bulgarian opposition cannot allow itself to lose the major alternative to the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] by sapping the SDS's strength. No individual can be so valuable that we would endanger the advance of the SDS, and any sacrifice is justified to avoid a shock within the SDS.

Accordingly, Dr. Zhelev can only be the united opposition's candidate if he participates in the preliminary elections. In no event can he be imposed as a candidate, or as the most suitable choice for the present political situation. I am waiting to hear from Dr. Zhelev as to whether he will agree to participate in the preliminary elections of the entire opposition. A word from him would be of the utmost importance at the present juncture. I think that he understands very well that he cannot be elected president without the votes of the SDS's firm electorate. The SDS candidate will face the same difficulty unless he can count on the entire democratic spectrum. This problem can only be resolved by preliminary elections. Otherwise, it would be better for us to toss a coin to see if Zhelev is to be the opposition's candidate, if I may speak jokingly.

[Veleva] If Dr. Zhelev wins the preliminary elections, will you personally or Ivan Kostov go out to campaign for him in the country, given the anti-Zhelev campaign that the SDS is now waging?

[Stoyanov] If Dr. Zhelev takes part in the preliminary elections and wins them, you have my word as a man and a politician that as SDS deputy chairman I will work for the success of the united candidate of the Bulgarian opposition forces. However, if the SDS candidate wins, I expect Dr. Zhelev and his staff to do the same for us.

[Veleva] An idea is beginning to be mooted that certain politicians in the People's Union and even the SDS regard as a winning formula, namely for Zhelev to run for president, and you — for vice president. If Dr. Zhelev wins the primary elections, and you come second, might you accept this version?

[Stoyanov] I would like to dispel this illusion — this formula played no role when I decided to run for president. In principle I never discuss anything before it becomes a current issue. Furthermore, the decision on such a formula is adopted by a party, not an individual. Speaking as an individual, I will not be shattered if I reach the final and lose. It was not one of my childhood dreams to become president. However, I will regard it as a personal defeat if the opposition fails to designate in the preliminary elections a candidate capable of winning the presidential elections. In my personal "wars," I have always thought that if is not terrible to lose your head; what is terrible is to lose your face. If the opposition is divided when it enters the elections, the SDS, by fighting for victory, is bound to preserve its political face.

Bulgaria: Greek Leftist Delegation Visits BSP

AU2802192496 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At the invitation of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council, a delegation of the coalition of Greek Progressive Forces, led by Chairman Nikos Konstantinopoulos, is visiting Bulgaria.

A meeting took place today between Georgi Purvanov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, and members of the Greek delegation.

Following the meeting, Mr. Purvanov said:

[Begin recording] We expressed our understanding of the situation in the Balkans, Bulgarian-Greek relations, and cooperation between the two countries in the Balkans. We also expressed an interesting idea, which is not new — namely, to hold a second forum of Balkan leftist forces. The first forum was held in 1995. Our guests were given a transcript of the 1995 forum discussion. Preparations for the new forum, which will probably take place in the spring of 1997, have already begun. The forum will include all leftist parties in the Balkans. [end recording]

The leader of the Greek delegation said:

[Begin Konstantinopoulos recording in Greek fading into Bulgarian translation] We had a very useful meeting

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with the deputy chairman of the BSP and his aides. The Coalition of Leftist and Progressive Forces in Greece thinks that relations between Bulgaria and Greece must have a strategic importance, and cooperation between our parties could contribute to this. We wish the BSP government success in its activity, because this is important for stability in the two countries and the Balkans. [end recording]

Bulgaria: BSP Attempting To Tighten 'Vise' Around Media

AU2902130196 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 27 Feb 96 p 6

[Commentary by Genka Markova: "Propaganda Capital"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 26 February Klara Marinova, chairman of the Propaganda Commission at BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] headquarters, presented an analysis of the BSP's information policy. The general impression from the analysis was that the members of the ruling party are enumerating all the possible alternatives for tightening the vise around the media. What else can be suggested by such ideas as creating a government newspaper or restoring the Socialist journalists association? A good example has already been provided for us in Bulgarian National Television, where a club for people with similar interests (i.e. Socialist Party interests) was formed only a few days ago.

There is only one commendable manner of maintaining contacts between any government and the media, and its name is openness: openness about government decisions and their consequences. However, when they have a reason to conceal something or to deny the obvious, the government and its party wrack their brains over propaganda policy and concoct analyses. In other words, they count very heavily on drawing capital from their propaganda machine. They regard the media as a propaganda tool and consider those newspapers and radio and television programs that cannot be used in this way as their enemies.

The question logically arises as to why the chief of the Government Press Center is being talked about just now in terms of the Raydovski affair. Bewilderment is the least thing that is provoked by an individual for whom, as is well known, the government's information policy is not his only weak spot.

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Czech Republic: Holan's Tender Decision Judged Illegal

AU2802171596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 23 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by "(km)": "Belehradek's Office Has Determined That Minister Holan Broke the Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—After a delay of more than two months, the Ministry for Economic Competition has concluded that Defense Minister Vilem Holan broke the law last November when he deliberately canceled a tender to supply a staff information system to the Army.

Ministry spokesman Jaromir Blazke confirmed yesterday that his office's final report on the results of the tender inquiry states that Holan had no right to cancel this tender.

Nevertheless, Belehradek's office also supported Holan's original verdict and eventually canceled the tender itself. "Therefore, the fact is Minister Holan was right: There are mistakes in the tender and it has to be canceled, but he did not have the right by law to take such a step because only our office could cancel it," said Blazke.

Despite this, this is the first case in which the work of a member of the current government has been judged illegal. Holan's office also faces a fine—whose amount, however, has not yet been determined—on account of the mistake made by its head. "It will be some time yet before we calculate the amount of damages, if, of course, any have arisen. According to the law, we have the right to impose a fine up to four years after the completion of the administrative procedure," said the head of the section for supervising public tenders in Belehradek's office, Vaclav Sedivy.

A fine amounting to up to 0.5 percent of the volume of the whole tender may be imposed on the Army. In view of the fact that the sum involved in the tender to install a staff information system is about 3.7 billion korunas [Kc], the Defense Ministry would have to pay almost Kc18 million. The financial penalty will, however, with all probability be far more modest in the end. For example, the experts from Belehradek's office are inclined toward a sum of Kc5.0 million; they point out, however, that this will merely involve transferring state money from one office to the other.

The Defense Ministry issued no statement yesterday on Belehradek's decision; it is, however, quite certain that it will appeal against it. That is, the Army is still insisting that Holan acted legitimately. So, it is not even out of the question that the contentious tender will eventually end up in court.

The director of the section overseeing public tenders, Vladimir Sedivy, made public a month ago his opinion that Holan broke the law. At that time, however, the ministry's management itself cast doubt on his pronouncement.

The tender was originally won by the U.S. Unisys company, which is also appealing against the decision to cancel it.

Czech Republic: Army To Invest Kc1 Billion in Air Force

AU2902114096 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 28 Feb 96 p 2

[CTK report: "A Billion for the Air Force"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Army is investing about 1 billion korunas [Kc] this year in the purchase of spare parts for the Air Force and in paying for the appropriate repairs to improve the technical condition of the aircraft. The Defense Ministry's objective this year is also to guarantee an average of at least 50 flying hours for pilot training, said General P. Strubl, inspector of the Air Force and Air Defense. He stated that, since 1990, the requests from pilots for repairs and spare parts have been about 50-percent covered. This has been manifested in, among other things, a reduction in the aircraft hardware inventory.

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Slovakia: Foreign Minister on EU Meeting in Brussels

LD2802212696 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] The session of the Association Council between the European Union and the Slovak Republic ended in Brussels on 27 February. Our delegation was led and the council session was chaired by Juraj Schenk, minister of foreign affairs. He talked about the results of the session at a meeting with a select group of journalists this afternoon. Our editor Peter Stano was one of those present:

[Stano] Minister Juraj Schenk briefly summed up what was discussed at the Association Council session. [passage omitted] Answering a question on whether the internal political problems in Slovakia were discussed as well, Schenk said:

[Begin recording] [Schenk] At no point during the session of the Association Council and nowhere in the final documents was it said what appeared in our press, unfortunately, that doubt was cast upon the stability of our political system and that the Slovak Republic was criticized in this respect.

Naturally, as far as this matter is concerned, the European Union stresses that Slovakia and all other associated countries, as well, must meet all of the criteria set at the Copenhagen summit—that is, including the criteria related to the stability of a political system.

[Stano] You said that during the discussion on the internal political situation in Slovakia attention was focused mainly on the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities and of their language. The Czech News Agency [CTK] wrote that the European Union pointed to the shortcomings in Slovakia in implementing the principles of democracy.

[Schenk] These issues were not discussed. There was no discussion about the internal political problems in Slovakia. It was merely stressed that the European Union attaches importance, in relation to all associated members, to a gradual implementation of all of the criteria approved at the Copenhagen summit, to a positive signal that would be the ratification, to a positive signal that will be the adoption of the law on the use of ethnic minority languages, and so forth. It was stressed that the European Union wants to participate actively in helping the associated members meet these criteria. So, all of these interpretations are disinterpretations. [passage omitted]

[Stano] At the end of February, the European Union told the Czech Republic that, during the first half of 1996, it would prepare a questionnaire on the basis of which it would assess when the dialogue about the Czech Republic's association could begin. Did Slovakia receive a similar notification at the Association Council session?

[Schenk] Slovakia did not receive such notification, but I would like to say that, on the basis of the outcome of the Madrid summit, all of the associated countries should be assessed according to the same criteria. We cannot expect that the Czech Republic or any other associated country would be given one set of criteria and another associated country or other associated countries another set of criteria. It means that the European Union works very intensely on a set of standard criteria that will be applied in assessing all of the countries. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Slovakia: Russian Foreign Minister Arrives for Talks

LD2902102896 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 29 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov arrived in Bratislava today. He will have talks with Slovak representatives, above all on bilateral and regional questions but probably also on the planned expansion of NATO.

The Russian foreign minister will first be received by President Michal Kovac. Primakov will then meet Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk. He will meet Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in the afternoon.

Slovakia: Comment: Significance, Timing of Primakov Visit

AU2902121896 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 28 Feb 96 p 3

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Primakov's Visit—Danaean Gift as Well as Opportunity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tomorrow's one-day visit of Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, the chief of Russian diplomacy, to Bratislava, announced recently, without any advance warning, first in Moscow, caused surprise (and also anxiety) not only in Slovakia but also in near and more distant foreign countries.

On the one hand, because the first foreign trip of the new Russian minister of foreign affairs (apart from the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States and an introductory dialogue with his U.S. counterpart, Warren Christopher, in Helsinki) takes him to, of all places, Slovakia and, on the other, in view of the visit's timing—one month before the EU summit in Turin, which will deal with the Union's eastward expansion, the candidates for which include Slovakia.

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Given this situation, it needs to be stressed that, for Meciar's government, Primakov's visit is, on the one hand, a Danaean gift, but, on the other, also an opportunity. It is a Danaean gift because of its timing, which is not the most fortunate from the viewpoint of Slovakia's interests, and it is an opportunity because it gives the government the chance to not only signal but also openly demonstrate what it not only embedded in its manifesto but what it claims to be aspiring to—admission to the euro-atlantic structures.

From the viewpoint of Russian interests, it is understandable that Moscow diplomacy is striving, if not to thwart, then at least to postpone or weaken the process of NATO's enlargement. And it is looking for allies in this endeavor, or at least for weak links in the chain. When one looks at the map, one does not have to be a military or political strategist to figure out that, in Central Europe, Slovakia is precisely such a spot. Moreover, it is (still) entirely dependent on supplies of strategic raw materials from Russia.

It is precisely this dependence, coupled with further, rather obscure, links to Moscow, that evokes doubts among Slovakia's many, no longer just potential, Western partners about the sincerity of the proclaimed aspirations. The Russian ambassador in Bratislava, too, added fuel to this fire of doubts by his statements in a recent interview for the Czech daily MLADA FRONTA DNES, which triggered an unexpectedly harsh reaction from the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The prime minister's slips of the tongue such as "they will have to accept us anyway, in view of our geostrategic position" have also attracted attention because this is not entirely true and also because it could spoil the aspirations of other candidates, particularly our direct neighbors.

Of course, the enlargement process has not even properly started and already it is being widely discussed from Washington to Moscow. The dice probably will not be cast until next year, after the presidential and congressional elections in Russia and the United States. Even Russia's position appears not to be final. The field is not limited by any high and impenetrable walls because, according to some signals, Moscow is mainly concerned that NATO should not become firmly established, first and foremost, in the Baltic.

However, at the moment it is difficult to predict how this search process will end. The discussions will be tough, and Slovakia, too, can make its not exactly insignificant contribution. What this contribution will be like lies, for the time being, in the hands of the Slovak Government and parliament. In the final analysis, however, the decision will have to be made by the voter in a referendum.

Slovakia: FM: Treaty With Hungary To Be Ratified in Mar

LD2702161796 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1500 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty will be ratified at the March session of the National Council.

This was stated in Brussels today by Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk at the joint news conference with Susanna Angelli, chairwoman of the European Union Council, and Hans van den Broek.

Susanna Angelli was pleased that the treaty will be ratified soon and that laws concerning use of ethnic minority languages will be adopted.

Slovakia: Meciar Comments on Kovac Jr Case, Palko Remarks

AU2802131896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 24 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Eva Laukova: "Prime Minister Did Not Disappoint at Ruzomberok Rally"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ruzomberok indoor arena was almost full last night. It was rally time and the majority of those present mainly wanted to hear the prime minister. He did not disappoint them. He talked a lot and about all kinds of things. He also beamed in on Vladimir Palko (Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]) and his statements on the television program "Kroky" [Steps]. He did not spare Palko: "As for the gentleman who was calling me names on television, I did not know him for a long time. Only when we set about establishing the state did I notice that I had some service on my hands. It was called the Federal Information and Security Service, the modern StB [communist-era secret service], and its deputy director, based in Prague, was this Mr. Palko. He is responsible for the removal of the [secret service] archives from Slovakia. This service targeted us as Slovak extremists, this service was fabricating materials about our being agents, rapists, and all sorts of other things only to discredit us. This service was also preparing my arrest in 1992. I could have reported this, that Gasparovic [current chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, then Czechoslovak prosecutor general] did not sign the warrant. Later they dismissed Gasparovic for this reason. And this man is calling me names on television today? Let StB General Lorenc [Czechoslovak deputy minister of interior and

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secret police chief before 1989] sit next to him; they are all the same."

This was not all that the prime minister had to say about the KDH. The prime minister supposedly cannot forgive the KDH for having drawn priests into politics. But at the same time he stressed: "I consider Cardinal Korec to be the greatest moral authority. Hrusovsky, too, is a good bishop." For a fairly long time, the prime minister had not spoken about the case of M. Kovac Jr. Yesterday he broke his silence: "I have problems with this topic. I do not tell everything I know, but, even so, the impression is created that I talk a lot. This is why I declared that I would not be making any more statements on Kovac Jr. For me he is a suspect, like anyone else being prosecuted for a crime. I consider the verdict of the Vienna court to be the court's business. We are returning to the situation in which, after his return home, our criminal prosecution bodies will be able to act. What I am not satisfied about is that his father goes abroad to testify before the court of another country and slings mud at a state agency of his own state. Moreover, the testimony was based on what he heard or on what someone else heard a third person say. Profession: engineer, president. [form of introduction used by Kovac before the Vienna court]. This is simply not done in such a high position. It was certain that they would return young Kovac anyway." The prime minister also had good news for mothers and, possibly, also for fathers. Those present applauded the fact that the government would be pushing for support for families with four children and for extending maternity leave until the child is five. The trade unions supposedly disagree with this, however. Yet the prime minister expects an agreement to be reached. He said that "we want a decision on an adjustment of old-age pensions to be made in the first half of the year." We learned, moreover, that Slovakia is a tiger. An Asian one: "The economic data are positive. When I said in 1993 that Slovakia would become one of the Asian tigers in Central Europe, everyone laughed. Today newspapers in the West write routinely about this."

The residents of Ruzomberok welcomed with applause the fact that their city is being reckoned with as a district capital, to be incorporated into the Zilina region.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 27 February on page 2 carries a 300-word report by Zita Sujova entitled "Palko on Meciar's Statements: It Is All Nonsense." The report includes the following passage on the reaction by Palko to Meciar's comments at the Ruzomberok rally: "Vladimir Palko's first reaction was laughter and the comment that it is pointless to reply to such nonsense. 'We have a chatterbox for prime minister,' he observed. Asked whether the Federal Security and Information Service had 'targeted' Meciar, he said: 'Of course not. But I never made a secret of the fact that we were collecting information on thefts of StB materials, which Mr. Meciar was then publicly using against his political adversaries, and on the destruction of other StB materials, which, conversely, testified to Mr. Meciar's links to the StB.' Palko went on to say: 'Vladimir Meciar was using the notarized copy of the StB file of the then deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council [reference to KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky's brother, Ivan Carnogursky]. This StB file was stolen at a time (that is, in 1990) when the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy was chaired by former StB member Jaroslav Svechota.'"]

Slovakia: Lexa Ordered To Submit Report on SIS Activity

AU2802140396 Bratislav[illegible] RODNA OBRODA in Slovak 27 Feb 96 pp [illegible]

[Article by Zita Sujova: "Ivan Lexa Must Submit to OKO a Written Report on Secret Service Activity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Slovak Information Service [SIS] Director Ivan Lexa has been ordered by the Special Supervisory Body over SIS [OKO] to submit to it a written report on the activity of the secret service during the recent period. This was decided by OKO members at an extraordinary meeting of OKO on 20 February. The convening of the meeting was requested in writing by OKO member Frantisek Gaulieder (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]) because, as he said in an interview for NARODNA OBRODA, the supervisory body is to meet at least every quarter, and the last session was held in November 1995. At that session, the SIS director was asked to submit a written report on recent SIS activities, but Lexa has not done so to date. Only at the 20 February session did Lexa provide information on SIS's activity, but only orally. Asked whether he has the feeling, on the basis of Lexa's report, that everything is all right in SIS and nobody within the service is engaged in any activities outside the law, Frantisek Gaulieder replied: "I think OKO can make such an assessment only after a more specific and detailed examination of SIS, which, according to the law, is OKO's duty. That is, OKO has to inspect the statutes, the basic documents necessary to draw money from the budget, the internal regulations governing the orientation and organizational structure of SIS components, the conditions for using special means, and the kinds and methods of keeping records."

According to Frantisek Gaulieder, Lexa replied to the questions of some OKO members. However, when asked whether these questions concerned the abduction

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of the president's son, the search of Bishop Balaz's house, the declassification of SIS activities, or the alleged revival of the StB [communist-era secret service] network of agents, Frantisek Gaulieder only answered evasively: "The questions concerned SIS activity over the recent period." Under the law on SIS, in the case of suspected illegal activity in SIS, OKO has the duty to inform the chairman of parliament, the prime minister, and the prosecutor general. Asked whether such indications exist, Frantisek Gaulieder remarked: "Look, we heard an oral report, but we asked for a written report, so only after the submission of a written report will we be able to give a competent reply." He added that, on the basis of the report that will be submitted by the SIS director, partial inspections will be carried out directly in SIS in the immediate future—that is, the real situation will be verified according to this report. OKO's enlargement was not discussed at the session. However, Frantisek Gaulieder and, according to his words, OKO Chairman Igor Urban are favorably disposed toward this idea.

According to plan, OKO should meet again within two months. However, should the National Council of the Slovak Republic include the report on SIS in the agenda of its March session, OKO will meet sooner.

Slovakia: SIS Said Preparing Case Against President

AU2802152596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 27 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "pt": "SIS Opened File Against President Michal Kovac"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—A well-informed source from circles close to the Slovak Information Service [SIS] has informed a SME editor that last Wednesday the SIS director issued an order to the SIS Analytical Department to collect and analyze all speeches delivered by Slovak President Michal Kovac at home and abroad since his inauguration in March 1993. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and TASR are to make available all public pronouncements by the head of state to the Analytical Department, which will analyze them together with the 26th SIS Department (Legal Department). Both intelligence and counterintelligence are to participate in this operation. All information is to be concentrated in the so-called investigation file of the secret service counterintelligence. According to the above source, SIS Director Ivan Lexa's order to this effect was discussed at a conference at SIS headquarters one day after it was issued. Some observers of the situation in SIS note that this step is the secret service chief's reaction to the decision of the Higher Provincial Court in Vienna not to extradite M. Kovac Jr. to Germany. Ivan Lexa's order did not meet with a positive response among all SIS members concerned. According to the source of the daily SME, it is therefore to be expected that some members who internally disagree with the involvement of the secret service in the domestic political conflict with the head of state will be dismissed from SIS. Relations and mutual trust among some SIS functionaries are eroded already. Counterintelligence Director Colonel Jaroslav S. suspects Engineer E. B., director of the Central Analytical Department, of contacts with the Israeli secret service Mossad. This is supposedly the channel through which information leaks from SIS reach the public. Likewise, suspicions are being harbored against Colonel Dezider K., an employee of SIS intelligence, whose daughter is living at an unknown place with former SIS member Oskar F. [who had confessed his participation in the abduction of President Kovac's son to Austria].

Slovakia: Decision Soon on SDL's Entry Into Coalition

AU2702133296 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Martin Krno: "Decision on SDL Joining the Government Will Be Made Toward the End of April"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—At yesterday's briefing, many journalists learned from Pavol Kanis, deputy chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], a piece of information that was expected any day now: At its meeting at Zemplinska Sirava last weekend, the SDL Executive Committee approved a conceptual paper entitled "Questions Concerning the SDL's Entry Into the Government Coalition." The document is to be assessed by the SDL Republican Board this Saturday.

The paper refers to the stage of unofficial contacts with representatives of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]. As Kanis said, the nature of these talks will determine their outcome. The former minister of defense supposes that the delicate issue of the SDL's entry into the government ought to be settled within two or two and a half months. The outcome of the discussion on this issue currently taking place within the members' base ought to serve as a point of reference in the final decision, which will be made at the Fourth SDL Congress in Nitra in late April or even earlier, by the SDL Republican Board.

Pavol Kanis pointed out that the issue of whether the SDL should join the government is on the agenda. Regardless of what the final reply is, the left-wing

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democrats must solve this issue to be able, at long last, to set out an unequivocal political direction and submit to the SDL congress a new Action Program in line with this direction. As for the limits of the consultations with government political entities (it transpired from Kanis's words that the Slovak National Party is not being reckoned with [as a coalition partner]), the SDL representatives will enforce pluralistic representation in National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] structures, changes in the composition of the government coalition, stability in the attitude by government executive power toward the head of state, the SDL's representation in the structures of the system of power, control of power, a clean course of privatization, and Slovakia's embedding in international integrative structures. Naturally, the SDL deputy chairman added, all of this would be pointless if the other side did not feel the need to correct its policies.

In reply to the recurrent question of whether an invitation had come from Tomasikova Street [HZDS headquarters] to take over part of the government responsibility, Pavol Kanis replied that groups exist within the SDL, the HZDS, and the ZRS that declare the necessity of cooperation among those three political entities. Several offers were put forward after the parliamentary elections of fall 1994, but the talks on the formation of a government coalition involving the SDL were not brought to a conclusion. Vladimir Meciar said at that time that he does not need the left-wing democrats, while SDL leaders did not state unequivocally that they would not join the government. The SDL has not received an official invitation from the HZDS of late, however. In the opinion of Pavol Kanis, the deepening of the antagonism between the government and the president and the division of society into two irreconcilable camps could bring Slovakia into a very difficult situation, complicating its international standing and jeopardizing its integration into European integrative structures. These are the most serious arguments justifying the considerations on the SDL's entry into the government. A responsible opposition state-forming [statotvorna] party, which the SDL considers itself to be, must carefully weigh all of these aspects.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 26 February on pages 1 and 2 carries a 600-word report by Martin Krno on a meeting of the SDL Republican Board in Bratislava on 24 February, which includes the following passage: "A fairly stormy discussion revolved, above all, around the 21 February news conference at which SDL Deputy Chairman Pavol Kanis informed journalists about the SDL Executive Committee's ideas concerning the tactics in deciding on the SDL's possible entry into the government, without prior consultation of this important matter with members of the Republican Board. In its resolution, the SDL Republican Board tersely 'took note of information on the course so far of the internal party discussion regarding the SDL's entry into the government. Until this discussion is concluded, we consider any positive or negative statements on this issue to be premature.' Annual meetings of primary organizations and clubs will continue until mid-March, to be followed by district party conferences. Only then should this issue be disentangled."]

Slovakia: Minister Ducky Discusses Completion of Mochovce

AU2802140096 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 24 Feb 96 p 4

[TASR report: "According to Minister Ducky, International Participation Guarantees Safety of the Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—At an international news conference in Bratislava on 22 February, Slovak Economy Minister Jan Ducky confirmed the decision of the Slovak Government to complete the Mochovce nuclear power plant (JE), despite the protests from Austria. "The participation of foreign firms operating all over the world guarantees the safety of Mochovce," the APA agency quoted Ducky as saying. The main supplier of the hardware will be the Czech enterprise Skoda Praha. The international consortium includes the French electric power company Electricite de France (EdF), the German concern Siemens, and even Russia.

The financing of Mochovce JE was secured, according to Ducky. The contracts were concluded, and only signatures are missing now. Skoda Praha will invest 300 million Czech korunas in the project, while Russia will invest $150 million. Two Czech banks will provide additional funds. The Czech Sporitelna [saving bank] will contribute the sum of 200 million German marks and the Komercni Banka $200 million. The investments of the Czech enterprises will be protected by state export guarantees, the economy minister declared, referring to information from the Czech Government. The French RdF concern will assume technical supervision of the project.

The change in financing the completion of the construction of Mochovce JE took place in order to obtain better conditions, Ducky stated. Following international protests, the financing through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development fell through. As Ducky announced, after the two reactor units in Mochovce are completed, which is planned for 1998, Slovakia intends to build two more units.

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Slovakia: National Bank Changes Inflation Forecast

AU2802150196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 27 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by CTK: "National Bank of Slovakia Revised Its Inflation Forecast for 1996"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) has revised its inflation forecast for 1996. In its forecast drawn up in December, it expected inflation at 6.0 to 7.5 percent. This has now been revised to 6.0 to 7.2 percent. This was announced by NBS Press Spokesman Jan Onda on Monday. NBS representatives presented these new expectations at a regular meeting last week with representatives of the commercial banks operating in Slovakia. At that meeting, NBS representatives also stated that, as of 14 February, the NBS's foreign exchange reserves reached $3.3 billion and the commercial banks' combined reserves another $1.55 billion. The Slovak Republic's overall debt stands at $5.4 billion, of which $2 billion is NBS and government debt. The current account of the balance of payments for January-November 1995 showed a surplus of 20.2 billion Slovak korunas.

Slovakia: Ex-Minister Challenges Unemployment Data

AU2702125496 Bratislava SME in Slovak 23 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "alg": "J. Brocka: Real Unemployment Is 1 Percent Higher Than the Government Claims"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—According to Julius Brocka, deputy to the National Council of the Slovak Republic from the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] and former minister of labor and social affairs, the level of unemployment did not fall in 1995 to the 13.6 percent proclaimed by the government, but is much higher. According to Brocka, the number declared by the government came about by means of administrative intervention. In accordance with the Law on Employment, labor offices struck part of the unemployed off their records for reason of so-called lack of cooperation—that is, because they turned down the offer of adequate employment. These people were "dropped" from the statistics. At a meeting with reporters yesterday, Brocka documented this with data on the number of those struck off the records, which show a growing number of such cases. In 1995 as a whole, 44,714 people were struck off the records, 25,225 of them in the second half of the year, which represents 1 percent of the unemployment rate. The true level of unemployment is thus 1 percent higher at 14.6 percent. In addition to the fact that the labor offices are no longer seeking suitable employment for them, those struck off the records also forfeit their claim to unemployment benefits and welfare payments. Compared with 1994, the situation is made even worse by the growing number of long-term unemployed, Julius Brocka said. At present, almost 70 percent of job seekers have been unemployed for more than six months, which is the highest proportion of long-term unemployed of any of the Visegrad Four countries.

Slovakia: TU Confederation Cancels 'State of Emergency'

AU2702124996 Bratislava SME in Slovak 21 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "lsz": "Trade Unionists Canceled State of Emergency but Will Not Sign General Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ) yesterday canceled the state of emergency [krizovy stav] declared on 30 October 1995 but decided not to sign the General Agreement for 1996 in its present wording. KOZ President Alojz Englis announced that the trade unionists want the General Agreement and are ready to sign it, but only after the employees' latest demands are projected into its wording. According to KOZ Vice President Vaclav Stevko, one large remaining disputed issue is the trade unionists' demand that negotiations on raising minimum wages and wage tariffs start as soon as the cost of living goes up 5 percent (the government originally proposed 10 percent). After two months of negotiations, the government conceded a limit of 7 percent, the trade unionists 6 percent. "Not this one percentage point is the bone of contention, but the principle," Stevko stressed. According to KOZ Vice President Marian Lacko, it is incomprehensible to the trade unions why, while amending the law on income tax, the Cabinet's promise was not realized that employees would be able to deduct travel expenses to and form work from their taxable income.

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Hungary: Medgyessy Consults MSZP Committees on Plans

AU2802172996 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 28 Feb 96 p 1

[Report by Szabolcs Szereto: "Medgyessy Wants 5 Percent Growth"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 27 February, Peter Medgyessy [finance minister designate] spoke about his ideas to the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] parliamentary group's budget and economic working groups: Priority will be given to the fight against inflation, reduction of interest rates, and encouragement of savings by the public.

On 27 February Medgyessy met MSZP parliamentary group leader Imre Szekeres, and then held an hour and a half long consultation with the parliamentary group's budget and economic working groups. Leaving the meeting, Medgyessy did not wish to talk about his ideas to the press. He said that he would be available to the correspondents on 29 February after the hearing by the parliamentary committees.

After the meeting, Gyozo Soos, head of the budget working group, told MAGYAR HIRLAP: They ensured Medgyessy of their support. He emphasized that the minister designate is not planning any fundamental changes in the government's economic policy. According to Medgyessy, stabilization has not yet been completed. At the same time, the reform of the state administration has to be started with special regard to the health and pension systems. Medgyessy believes that the reform process could last as long as 15 to 20 years.

Soos said that Medgyessy found the 2 percent economic growth last year too low and he would like to achieve 5 percent growth by 1997. Medgyessy also included the notion of solidarity in his economic policy. In his view, it is unacceptable for the strata that are falling behind to further increase in size, and special emphasis has to be placed on encouraging individual activity in the fight against poverty.

Medgyessy would like to change the social insurance system without damaging the autonomy of the social insurance self-governments. He would like to reduce the tax burdens; he especially finds the personal taxation keys too high. The fate of the privatization extra incomes was not discussed at the 27 February meeting, but Medgyessy indicated that he wished to work together with Privatization Minister Tamas Suchman. Medgyessy promised that he would consult the Socialist deputy group before every significant decision. In reply to a question, he said that he wished to be a finance minister until the end of the parliamentary cycle. Medgyessy is not planning any personnel changes in the Finance Ministry, he first wishes to familiarize himself with the situation after taking office.

Soos emphasized that Medgyessy would like the government's economic cabinet to have real decision-making rights. This way, the cabinet could work as the government's top economic organization. He would also like to see to it that the political state secretary not be allowed to sit in for the finance minister at cabinet sessions.

Hungary: Bosnian-Hungarian Rail Cooperation Accord Signed

LD2702191596 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The managing director of the Hungarian State Railways [MAV], Zoltan Rigo, and the head of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Railways, Nadzad Brankovic, today discussed the possibilities of rebuilding the Bosnia-Herzegovina rail network, and Hungarian participation in this. After the meeting the two parties signed a cooperation agreement in Budapest.

[Begin Brankovic recording in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed translation into Hungarian] The peace process has created an urgent need to reinstate the Budapest-Sarajevo-Ploce railway line, as this is one of the most important transit lines suitable for commercial, public and freight transport. Thus we expect concrete offers from Hungarian and Croatian investors for the rebuilding of the Sava river's destroyed bridges, since the lack of these is making transit towards the Ploce harbor rather difficult. [end recording]

The MAV offered primarily building construction and vehicle repair works to the Bosnian side, but participation in manufacturing parts, passing on technologies, and the possibility of experts' cooperation were also discussed at the talks.

Hungary: Russian Weapons Shipments To Arrive in Apr

AU2802152096 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Feb 96 p 1

[Correspondent's report: "More Russian Weapons To Arrive, but Later"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian armored personnel carriers and other military technology promised to the Hungarian Army and the Border Police for October 1994 in exchange for the Russian debt to Hungary will be arriving in April 1996 at the earliest.

These two military bodies could purchase military technology worth $320 million. The Hungarian Army

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has purchased $50 million worth of BTR-80 armored carriers, 400 METIS armor-piercing rockets, including 15 launching pads, as well as spare parts, engines, and other major components for the MIG-29 aircraft stationed in Kecskemet. The BTR-80s will be used for the army's land troops.

The Border Police have also purchased 68 pieces of BTR-80 carriers for border police units, as well as night-watch installations, bullet-proof vests, and Lada Nova jeeps.

NEPSZABADSAG has learned that the supply of all this should have started at the end of 1994, but the Russian ministries had not yet agreed on ways of internal financing at the time.

NEPSZABADSAG has also learned that Defense Ministry officials negotiated with the manufacturers, the suppliers, and representatives of various ministries in January 1996 and were told that the Russian ministries had agreed among themselves.

The two sides must now work out the shipment schedules. According to the experts, this could take one month, so the first shipment could reach Hungary in April at the earliest.

The Russian suppliers have taken it upon themselves to send more BTR-80s to compensate the Hungarian Army for the delay: Thus, they will be sending 450 BTR-80s instead of the 160 originally planned.

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B-H: Djukic Allegedly Linked With Yugoslav Army

MS2902171896 London THE GUARDIAN in English 29 Feb 96 p 12

[Report by Ed Vulliamy: "Serbian Lies the World Chose to Believe"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Djorde Djukic, the Serbian general being held in The Hague by war crimes investigators, is a general in the army of Yugoslavia proper, which years ago promised to pull out of the Bosnian war, and not an officer in the Bosnian Serb army.

The revelation that the general is Belgrade's man has explosive implications for the Dayton peace agreement, while cutting to the core of the history of the conflict by revealing Belgrade's secret role in the Bosnian Serb war machine.

It will also propel the Hague war crimes investigations in a direction the diplomatic world most fears: towards Belgrade and the Serbian president Slobodan Milosovic, on whose co-operation the Dayton deal depends.

The Guardian has exclusively obtained Gen Djukic's military identity documents, which show him serving in the Yugoslav army, with annual accreditation from General Staff headquarters in Belgrade until 1996.

At The Hague yesterday Mr Djukic's lawyers said he was being held unlawfully and demanded his immediate release. Mr Djukic has been detained by the tribunal since February 12. He and another Serb, Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, were seized by Bosnian government police when they took a wrong turn near Sarajevo. The two are being held on suspicion of war crimes but have not yet been indicted by the tribunal which will decide tomorrow whether to do so.

Documents obtained by the Guardian also reveal that contrary to its successive promises to the international community, the Yugoslav army has always been, and still is, deeply emeshed in military affairs in Bosnia.

Classified military maps from the Yugoslav army reveal that it intended an all out war against any international intervention in Bosnia at a time when that was being advocated by Germany and the United States in 1991.

Leaked military correspondence between Bosnia and Belgrade shows that the army General Staff in the Serbian capital secretly organised the Serbian military campaign in Bosnia. This has been often supposed, but never conclusively proved.

President Milosevic has given guarantees to successive international mediators that the army of Yugoslavia, VJ, would abandon and blockade the Bosnian Serb army, VRS.

In the spring of 1993, faced with acute American anger, Mr Milosevic promised to seal the border between Yugoslavia and his blood-brothers in Bosnia, and block assistance to the VRS. His word was accepted. America pulled back from the brink.

In August 1994, Mr Milosevic promised "military and political sanctions" against the Bosnian Serbs, breaking military connections and allowing only the passage of humanitarian aid. The UN Security Council duly suspended sanctions against Serbia/Yugoslavia on September 23.

Mr Milosevic gave his word at Dayton that his army had long abandoned the Bosnian Serb warlord, General Ratko Mladic, wanted for genocide.

But now we can show that Mr Milosevic's "blockade" of the Bosnian Serbs was a sieve, his assurances a giant lie.

Reports submitted to the UN Security Council by international monitors trying to patrol the Serbian-Bosnian border reveal a constant traffic of military equipment, munitions, planes and troops across the border from Yugoslavia into Bosnia.

Gen Djukic is, by the admission of the Bosnian Serbs, head of logistics for their army. And the monitors, reports show what a vast operation it was to bring this war machine into Bosnia.

The flood of men and weapons escalated before the bloody offensives against Bihac and Srebrenica. As head Of logistics, Gen Djukic would have been pivotal.

The Bosnian Serb authorities have told the Guardian that Gen Djukic is an innocent, elderly man with a heart condition, fulfilling a workaday logistics role at VRS headquarters.

But Gen Djukic's military card is headed Vojska Jugoslavia, the Yugoslav army. It is stamped annually until 1996, showing the number of his military post, 2130, and its location, Belgrade. The card bears the symbol of the double-headed eagle Of Yugoslavia, distinguished from that of the Bosnian Serbs by the fact that the eagle has no crown.

A second card headed Yugoslav army also attaches him to VJ unit 1089 in Belgrade citing his address as 3 King Aleksander Kardjordjevica in Han Pjesak, just inside Bosnia, where Gen Mladic has his headquarters.

It is known that the Yugoslav military intervened on behalf of Bosnian Serbs in the early stages of the war. But the Guardian now possesses two maps which show the Yugoslav army ready to fight for Bosnia against international peacekeeping forces.

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The maps, drawn up in 1991, draft an all-out war against Nato or the United Nations, directed from Belgrade. They show the various corps grouped around population centres, especially those with high Serbian populations.

Units marked in yellow are Strike Forces, grouped along borders with Croatia where international forces were expected to be deployed. Units marked in pink are War Formations attached to every corps.

Units marked in green are Reserve Class, reserve class, ready for mobilisation. These are believed to include the infamous paramilitary formations which undertook savage "mop-up" operations under the command of gangsters like Captain Arkan.

The JNA, the old communist Yugoslav people's army told the world that it would pull out of Bosnia in May 1992. But an extraordinary internal correspondence between Belgrade and Bosnia shows how the Yugoslav army was stitched into the war, directing the Bosnian Serb military.

On February 17 1992, the JNA's chief of staff (later Yugoslav defence minister), General Blagoj Adzic, issued an order to the command of the Second Military District—aka Bosnia. Gen Adzic talks of the arrival of UN forces, and says bluntly: "In the selection of new garrisons for the JNA, you must first have in mind the rapid deployment of the JNA in the protection of the Serbian people."

On the same day, a reply came from Colonel Milan Prtina in the Bihac area, requesting additional arms for Serbian communities in Bosanska Petrovac, Grahovo, Glamoc and Dvar, all later scenes Of ethnic cleansing.

One month later, on March 17, the "Serbian municipality of Foca"—one of the most savagely subjugated towns—wrote "for the personal attention of General Blagoj Adzic." Subject: Request for a new garrison in Foca.

The letter offers immediate accommodation "for some 400 troops" from Yugoslavia.

On March 7, the Command of the Second Military District sent a "Report on the state of preparations for the arrival Of peacekeeping forces of the UN" to the General Staff in Belgrade. The report talks about the militarisation of new police units, and the "unresolved status of active military officers who are ready if needed to transfer from this service to the organs and units of the ministry of the interior." There is also an intriguing line about "the insuffiency of data on weapons distributed to the population"—the JNA-armed Serbian citizenry.

The same document says that one brigade, the Ninth Motorised, has been "reinforced by the 14th Garrison of the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro."

Thus entwined with Bosnia's war, the JNA stayed long after its declared May departure date. Muslims from the eastern towns of Visegrad, Zvorkik and Foca were driven out or killed by units brought in from Serbian garrisons at Uzice, Novi Sad and Nis. Special police units based at Nis and Pancevo were mobilised, and would be throughout the war. Their commander in Belgrade is called "Frenki" Stamatovic.

The pivotal memo came on April 24, in paragraph six of a report to Belgrade on morale in the Second Military District. It talks not about the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army, but of its "transformation." It reads: "All units and institutions of the Second Military District were informed about the transformation Of the JNA... Informal meetings were held by all units of the Second Military District."

It adds: "Some commanding officers wanted clarification of the status of the JNA military units and the status of active military officers who are to be retired but have not regulated their housing problems." The officers, and those who continued to serve, need not have worried. Financially, Belgrade remained in charge and paid the salaries of officers in the Bosnian Serb army above the rank of major. Salaries rose from 500 German marks to 1,500 for the highest ranks, a fortune by Bosnian standards.

Although it agreed to accept Mr Milosevic's word and suspend sanctions the UN knew Belgrade was lying. The Guardian has been shown copies of reports sent to the Security Council by international monitors at border crossings, showing a constant flow of armour into Bosnia until July 1995.

As a Yugoslav army general in charge Of logistics in Bosnia, and based at the Han Pjesak headquarters, Gen Djukic would have been the man responsible for mobilising this tidal wave of munitions from his Yugoslav army to the Bosnian Serbs, and distributing it throughout forces which laid murderous siege to Muslim and Croat communities.

In the year up to July 1995, monitors logged 512 tanks, 506 armoured personnel carriers 368 trucks of ammunition an 14 lorries of artillery munitions, 120 heavy mortars, 130 heavy canons, 48 rocket batteries and 1.9 million gallons of fuel crossing from Serbia. The flow accelerated before the Bihac offensive of 1994 and the debacle at Srebrencia last year, supplemented by 33 laser-guided missiles.

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The monitors saw the tip of the iceberg. In addition to usual crossing points, VJ engineers would lay pontoon bridges across the Drina river at night, and lift them before dawn. Eight locations are listed where monitors would find fresh heavy vehicle tracks leading down to the river and up the other side.

Repair work was either done in Yugoslavia, or used Yugoslav engineers, and this would have been part of Gen Djukic's work.

In Banja Luka last week the Guardian asked Gen Mladic's adjutant, Colonel Milan Milutinovic to describe Gen Djukic's role in the Bosnian war. Col Milutinovic told us his task was to "distribute bread and potatoes."

B-H: Hague Tribunal To Rule on Djukic Case 1 Mar

AU2802163396 Paris AFP in English 1608 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, Feb 28 (AFP)—The UN war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on Wednesday adjourned for two days its hearing for a motion to release a Bosnian Serb general.

French Judge Claude Jorda, who presided over the hearing, said the tribunal would rule on whether General Djordje Djukic should be released Friday afternoon.

Djukic, who was arrested by Bosnian government police on January 30 along with his deputy Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, was transfered to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague on February 12.

The general's lawyer argued that the court's detention of his client is in violation of both international and Bosnian law and that he could not be held beyond the statutory 30 days set by Bosnian law.

But the court said it needed additional time to study Bosnia's legal system and said it had been informed by Bosnian authorities that Djukic's detention had been extended by a month.

B-H: Hague Tribunal Rejects Motion for Djukic's Release

LD2802233296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2315 GMT 28 Feb 96

["Pool" item by Vladimir Holovka]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, Feb 28 (TANJUG)—The Hague Tribunal for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia rejected Wednesday a motion for the release of Bosnian Serb General Djordje Djukic. Djukic's counsel, Belgrade lawyers Milan Vujin and Toma Fila, filed the motion on the grounds of lack of evidence, the tribunal's infringement of the legal process and Bosnian Muslims' unlawful action in arresting Gen. Djukic.

Gen. Djukic was arrested by Muslim police in Sarajevo on Jan. 30, together with Bosnian Serb Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, while en route to talks with peacekeepers.

In a public hearing Wednesday morning, Vujin affirmed that Gen. Djukic had been unlawfully arrested by Bosnian Muslim authorities in January and, again unlawfully, transported to The Hague in mid-February before charges had been brought.

The panel's presiding judge was Claude Jorda of France, and members, Elizabeth Odio Benito of Costa Rica and Fouad Riad of Egypt.

Vujin said that Djukic and Krsmanovic had been arrested while going to Sarajevo's [word indistinct] district to inspect facilities to be used by the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR), which was a legitimate official mission for which they held valid passes.

He said that Muslim authorities had issued the warrants for their arrest seven days after the actual arrest, which was another violation of the law.

(?Vujin) explained that the arrests had been made under the law of the former Yugoslavia which is still in force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and which limits the duration of detention on remand to 30 days.

In the afternoon hearing, Djukic's counsel again appealed to the tribunal to release their client within the mandatory 30 days which expire on Feb. 29.

Chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone asked the tribunal, however, for a continuance for another 30 days to collect evidence for war crime allegations against Gen. Djukic and Col. Krsmanovic.

Vasvija Vidovic, who represents the Bosnian Muslim Sarajevo government, asked the tribunal to return the officers to Sarajevo were she said her government had evidence of their guilt.

However, the court adjourned until Friday, March 1, when it would again hear counsel for both sides and decide whether to keep Djukic on remand or release him on March 4, when the 30 days of the court's signing of the remand order expire.

The court's inability to make a clear ruling in the matter on Wednesday is seen by observers as proof that the case has a political background.

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Neither Toma Fila last week nor Milan Vujin this week managed to get the court to offer a single reliable evidence to prove grounds for the arrest of the Bosnian Serb officers.

Their requests for full documentation on the case have met in equal proportions with more delays and incomplete unsubstantiated documents.

NATO and E.U. sources have been heard to criticise the case as hurting the reputation both of these organisations and the tribunal itself.

Numerous laws and regulations and the army code of behavior have clearly been violated in this case, as has the time-honored rule of war that dictates that negotiators should not be arrested or shot at.

There are fears that this serious legal scandal could hurt the reputation of The Hague tribunal, especially if the officers' innocence is established.

B-H: JCK Says Muslims Mistreated Djukic, Krsmanovic

LD2802174396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1613 GMT 28 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 28 (TANJUG)—The officers of the Army of Serb Republic (R.S.), the Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, have had a humiliating treatment in a Muslim jail in Sarajevo, the Yugoslav Red Cross (JCK) announced on Wednesday.

Djukic and Krsmanovic presented this in a talk with JCK President Radovan Mijanovic who, during his official stay in Holland, called on them on February 25 in the Dutch Sheveningen jail near The Hague where they are kept now.

On January 30 in Sarajevo, they were arrested by Muslim troops in the territory of this city under IFOR control, while they were on their way to negotiations.

Their arrest had not been reported immediately, but when it was made public a week later, the Muslim side suspected them of war crimes and shortly afterwards IFOR transported them urgently to The Hague where they were jailed.

The ad hoc Hague-based tribunal for war crimes committed in the civil war in the former Yugoslavia has so far indicted around fifty persons, most of them Serbs, several Croats and no one of the Muslims.

The tribunal now intends to collect evidence for possibly indicting General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic whose names are on the list of war crimes suspects.

General Djukic said he had spent 12 days in the Sarajevo jail where treatment was humiliating and the first medical checkup was performed only on the seventh day although he had reported his illness to the jail authorities.

'Although I had made it known that I have recently had my pancreas operated on, doctors examined me only on the seventh day,' said Djukic.

Djukic and Krsmanovic told Mijanovic that in the Muslim jail in Sarajevo they had not had even the minimum hygienic conditions while during 12 days they were visited by 24 investigators.

As General Djukic put it, on the seventh day after their arrest, they were visited by a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) but even after this visit the treatment in the jail had not improved.

General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic stressed that the conditions in Sheveningen were correct, the JCK announcement said.

The JCK president was in Holland February 22-26 at the invitation of the association of clubs of Yugoslav who live and work in that country. He also called at the Dutch Red Cross.

B-H: Muslims Release Bodies of Eight Croat Civilians

LD2802174696 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with the agreement on exchange, Muslim representatives handed over bodies of eight Croat civilians to the Croat side, the Herzeg-Bosnia office for the exchange of prisoners and missing persons announced this morning. The Croat civilians were killed during the Muslim-Croat clashes of 1993. They were all residents of eastern Mostar.

The Croat side asked for 18 bodies, but the Muslim side promised 11 and finally handed over only eight bodies of murdered civilians.

The remains have been taken to the pathological unit of Split hospital for identification.

B-H: Muslims Fire Tear Gas Projectiles at Grbavica

LD2802202396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1945 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 28 Feb (SRNA)—The Muslims today fired several projectiles filled with tear

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gas at Grbavica from their part of Sarajevo, it has been confirmed to SRNA by the Novo Sarajevo [Bosnian Serb] police station.

IFOR [Implementation Force] representatives, who have toured the places where the projectiles landed, also reported large concentrations of tear gas.

B-H: NATO Official on Why Karadzic Was Not Arrested

AU2802191396 Paris AFP in English 1853 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Feb 28 (AFP)—NATO troops present at a meeting at which Bosnian Serb leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic was briefly spotted Tuesday did not have sufficient fire power with them to attempt to arrest him, an embarrassed NATO diplomat said Wednesday.

Karadzic, under indictment for genocide, was in the same building used to host a high-level meeting of Serb, Moslem and Croat officials and by the senior civilian envoy Carl Bildt in northern Bosnia Tuesday, Bildt's aides acknowledged.

"Troops of the (NATO-led Implemention Force) IFOR do not have to arrest a war criminal if they do not have the means," the NATO diplomat said in Brussels, where the alliance is based.

The military detachment accompanying Bildt to the meeting consisted of a helicopter and small personal escort, the diplomat said.

"IFOR was not there with an armoured division. Karadzic always runs around with an elite guard," the diplomat added. "We can't ask our troops to take on a suicide mission."

Bildt, the high representative responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton peace accords, did not meet Karadzic at the meeting.

Under the Dayton accords, international officials involved in implementing the peace plan and members of the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) are banned from having contact with indicted war criminals.

Under the Dayton pact, IFOR troops have the authority—but not the obligation—to detain indicted war criminals and hand them over to a war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

B-H: Karadzic Talks With Pale Media Personnel

LD2802234996 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bosnian] Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic and Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik talked with journalists from the [Bosnian] Serb radio and television in Pale today [28 February]. The talks concentrated on the current political and economic situation in the Serb Republic and the role and tasks of the media.

[Unidentified correspondent] Addressing the journalists, President Karadzic said that the Serb Republic was an expression of the aspirations of the Serb people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina to create their national state in which they could have the same rights as all the other European peoples and which is characteristic of democratic societies.

The president gave full credit to representatives of the public media which greatly contributed to the creation and development of the youngest Serb state.

Speaking about the current situation in the Serb Republic, Karadzic said that we must not allow regional interests to prevail over state ones and that we must oppose another danger—the fact that we are constantly pitted against Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In the course of the talks, problems of the Serb radio and television were also discussed, especially lack of coordination after NATO bombing raids in which the majority of transmitters of the Serb radio and television were destroyed.

It was concluded that the primary task was to establish a uniform system of telecommunications in our country.

B-H: Kasagic Comments on Lifting Economic Sanctions

AU2802203196 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[Statement by "Serb Republic Prime Minister" Rajko Kasagic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The UN Security Council has finally decided to implement the Dayton accord section concerning the suspension of sanctions against the Serb Republic [RS].

We believe that [words indistinct] 20 January. However, whenever we insisted, they said that some of the Dayton accord provisions were unclear and that they were being interpreted in New York. Finally, all the forces and the representatives of all sides decided in Rome to [passage indistinct] the suspension of the sanctions, and

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they would have been suspended five days earlier if cooperation had existed between IFOR [Implementation Force] and the Serb Republic Army. General Djukic's arrest—that is, kidnapping—disturbed these relations a little, and I hope that there will be no such cases in the future. Such cases were clarified in Rome.

With the suspension of sanctions, the RS is entering the international community and leaving this ghetto that the world imposed due to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the way for us to establish connections with Serbia and Montenegro. I believe that this will be our priority since we have been developing [words indistinct]. Moreover, our producers are not able to compete with market economy producers. Ours will be a gradual way of developing the production forces and fitting into the market trends in Europe and the rest of the world.

B-H: RS' Kondic Comments on Suspension of Sanctions

AU2802200796 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The lifting of the sanctions against the Serb Republic [RS] means the establishment of new relations with countries of economic interest, primarily the FRY, said Novak Kondic, minister of finance, in his statement to Srpski Radio.

Peacetime business and money transfers with Yugoslavia will be established soon. The RS Government has been working on creating the atmosphere for this decision. Very soon, the economic agents' readiness to operate under new conditions will be [word indistinct], added Kondic.

B-H: RS Bank President on Suspension of Sanctions

AU2802201096 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The decision to suspend sanctions will make it possible to conduct business under more normal circumstances, but changes should not be expected to occur overnight, stated Momcilo Pejic, president of the National Bank of the Serb Republic [RS], commenting today on the decision to suspend sanctions.

Considering that many problems caused by the state of war and the economic blockade have been overcome, the establishment of money transfers with the FRY becomes inevitable, as do, consequently, measures regarding the invalidation of bearer cheques.

According to Pejic, lifting the economic blockade creates the conditions for fast revival of the economy, more employment, and the improvement of living standards.

B-H: Observers Stop 'Monitoring' After Sanctions Lifted

AU2802155096 Paris AFP in English 1453 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 28 (AFP)—International observers Wednesday [28 February] stopped monitoring the border between rump Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serb Republic following the UN decision to suspend economic sanctions against rebel Serbs.

Abel Zele, a spokesman for the observers who were operating under the International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) said all monitoring had been stopped.

He said the observers withdrew "following the report that (NATO Secretary General Javier) Solana sent to the Security Council and the sanctions against Republika Srpska have been suspended."

The observers began monitoring the border between the rebel-controlled area of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro which make up rump Yugoslavia in September 1994 to ensure that the UN sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs were being respected by Belgrade.

The UN Security Council announced Tuesday the suspension of UN economic sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs.

The US envoy to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, said that as the Serbs had complied with military requirements specified in the Dayton peace accords, the sanctions had been suspended with immediate effect.

B-H: RS Abolishes Coupons, Introduces FRY Dinar

AU2802122896 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 25 Feb 96 p 7

[Report by Sl. P.: "Abolishing Coupons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bearer checks or coupons used in the Serb Republic [RS] have finally had it. With the decision of the RS Government as of 29 February only the Yugoslav dinars will be in circulation. Until then, all companies are obliged to find a commercial bank through which they will pay out personal incomes. In fact, this will be going back to the old system—checkbooks.

The government, intentionally or not, has chosen the leap year date to abolish this method of payment that has given rise to numerous "irregularities" with which individuals have been filling their pockets. It is well-known that issuing coupons was without any control and, what is even worse, they were without

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any cover. The coupons generated rampant inflation and the exchange rate between the Yugoslav dinar and the coupon was affected at the very beginning. Virtually all the goods that used to be paid for in cash were double the price when paid with bearer checks. Currency dealers used to sell up to 800 dinars worth of checks for 100 German marks. The same amount of German marks could only purchase 350 dinars.

It remains to be seen whether the regular checks will have adequate cover in goods and services and whether they will introduce more order.

B-H: Kasagic Says Serbs Will Return to Sarajevo

AU2802215996 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 28 Feb 96 pp 14-15

[Interview with Serb Republic Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic by Djoko Kesic; place and date not given: "The Serbs Will Return to Sarajevo One Day"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "For a long time, the Serbs in Sarajevo were psychologically prepared by their leaderships that parts of the Sarajevo region in which they live would remain under Serb control. As the Dayton accords see Sarajevo as part of the Muslim-Croat Federation, this was a shock for the Serbs, and by reflex action, they are now leaving their city," Serb Republic Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic said in an interview to TELEGRAF, answering our question why Serbs are leaving Sarajevo when, after the meeting in Rome, international community representatives, as well as President Milosevic, claimed that maximal guarantees for the safety of Serbs in this city had been achieved.

[Kasagic] In Rome we demanded that Sarajevo be organized like Brussels and that authorities in the Serb part of Sarajevo not be changed until elections are organized in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would be logical. However, we did not get what we wanted, and the Muslim-Croatian Federation rushed to send its militia in Serb Sarajevo, so now people there are fleeing.

[Kesic] How justified are the international community's claims that the Serb leadership, for various reasons, is encouraging Serbs to leave Sarajevo?

[Kasagic] There have been plenty of such slipups on the part of certain Serb politicians, but that is beside the point. The Serbs have good enough reason to fear the Muslim-Croatian authorities. The war between us lasted 42 months, and, consequently, at this stage, we cannot talk about any sort of confidence, let alone firm beliefs that they would be at least partly protected in such circumstances. However, after a certain time, the Serbs will start to come back to Sarajevo, just like some Krajina Serbs, who are announcing their return to Krajina because there is no other possibility for them. The pressure on the Serb Republic is great, as well as the burden and hopes of 100,000 people who left their homes in just a few days and sought refuge in a devastated country. Our funds are exhausted, and we have to find a solution how to deal with the situation in the future. [passage omitted]

[Kesic] What do you expect to happen after the extradition of General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic to the Tribunal in The Hague?

[Kasagic] The trust in impartiality of The Hague Tribunal has been shaken in the eyes of many people and institutions, not only local but also foreign ones, because of the Tribunal's acceptance of the kidnapped officers' extradition. I would have believed in the excuse that they would be better off in The Hague than in Sarajevo if they had been released immediately after the extradition. Great confidence in IFOR and the Serb Republic army's good cooperation with them has been shaken as well, despite our resumption of cooperation with them. However, our armed army must cooperate, otherwise a war would break out again. I think everything must be done to prevent incidents that could influence the cessation of work on the implementation of the Dayton accord.

[Kesic] Will the Serb Republic army arrest Muslims and Croats suspected of war crimes as well?

[Kasagic] The summit in Rome eliminated unclarities regarding arrests of persons suspected of war crimes. No party has a right to compose a list of war criminals based on its personal judgment or to arrest suspects. Such activities must be carried out on the basis of arrest warrants issued by The Hague Tribunal and in compliance with European legal standards. [passage omitted]

[Kesic] According to our knowledge, you have had certain contacts with the Croatian authorities in Zagreb. What did you discuss, and is the revival of the Serb-Croat alliance in Bosnia in sight?

[Kasagic] My contacts with some Croatian officials are more significant in terms of establishing humanitarian cooperation. Our main goal is to accomplish the release of prisoners of war on both sides, find missing persons, and then normalize economic cooperation. My contacts have been the first steps in that direction, and very significant ones, indeed, on the basis of which we are discovering mutual interests, but also occurrences we disagree with. I think this is how to overcome the horrors of war, the way that leads to the strengthening of peace.

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No alliance in Bosnia is possible if one side is missing, which proved to be the case in the past. The war lasted right up until all three sides signed the peace agreement.

[Kesic] You have frequent contacts with Serbian President Milosevic. What are the economic and political relations like between the FRY and the Serb Republic, and how do you view the future prospects of those relations?

[Kasagic] Serbian President Milosevic esteems activities aimed at keeping the peace in the region, but at the same time he knows what the dangers are for the Serb people in case of war. By his determination he contributed to the result that the documents signed in Rome are void of any texts disadvantageous for the Serbs. He achieved that certain advantages of the Serbs in governing Sarajevo do not serve as a model to other cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Dayton accords on peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina anticipates the possibility of establishing particular connections between the Serb Republic and other countries, but with regard paid to the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Life alone will show the sort and form of development of the relations with Serbia and Montenegro, and our desire is to constantly strengthen them.

The Serb Republic's economic relations with Serbia are conditioned by the lifting of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, because any violation of the embargo imposed on us places any country that violates it in a very difficult position. Russia's unilateral lifting of the embargo is significant to us more in terms of moral support, whereas for the Russian Government it has a political weight. However, I am sure they would have a different attitude if Russia happened to border on the Serb Republic.

[Kesic] How do you view the economic prospects of the Serb Republic and the possibilities of development and economic cooperation with the former Yugoslav republics and the Muslim-Croatian Federation?

[Kasagic] I see the Serb Republic as an open country of private entrepreneurship rich in natural resources. All this makes possible its rapid progress, predominantly based on commodity exchange with the former Yugoslav republics, in which economy develops in a complementary way and in which technology is at approximately the same level as elsewhere. The Serb Republic accepts the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as its partner, because it is linked with it by a rail network and an electric power system. Railway transport of goods from the western part of the Serb Republic into Serbia is possible via Vinkovci or Tuzla. As the Muslims are interested in using railroads leading to Belgrade or the port of Bar, it is obvious that our interests in that respect coincide.

Businessmen from the Republic of Slovenia are already establishing contacts with businessmen from the Serb Republic, desiring to resume business cooperation. Courses of economic cooperation between businessmen from the Serb Republic and those from other former Yugoslav republics will develop according to mutual interests, and I think nobody will be able to hinder them.

[Kesic] Relations between Pale and Banja Luka turned out to be a serious political problem before the war's end. What are those relations like today?

[Kasagic] I see certain individual's behavior in the Serb Republic as their attitude toward the victims of the past war. Any contribution to the lack of mutual understanding or encouraging of such occurrences, as well as disagreements at the state level, are a danger for the people and the state. President Karadzic always resolved such incidents successfully because they never became a general trend. They were always statements by individuals without any serious content.

[Kesic] Which city will be the capital of the Serb Republic, Banja Luka or Pale?

[Kasagic] Until 14 March, we are obliged to accommodate our constitution to that of Bosnia-Herzegovina's. Since we have remained without a capital city, the Serb Republic will have to deal with the issue by changing a provision in our constitution. Regarding this constitutional change, I believe outvoting will occur in the Assembly. Cadre potentials, the unresolved issue of Brcko, and some additional reasons require that the capital be moved as westward as possible in the Serb Republic.

[Kesic] It has been announced that the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be conducted under the auspices of the international community. Do you think it is possible to conduct regular elections under the current circumstances?

[Kasagic] The tutelage of the international community over the peoples living in Bosnia-Herzegovina shows its distrust of those peoples, and this distrust is causing suspicion with the other side as well. The possibility for all citizens to vote in their place of residence at the time when the 1991 census was conducted, regardless of where they are living now, speaks for the complexity and uniqueness of this voting system. Any party dissatisfied with the impossibility to control ballots cast by people voting abroad will suspect the regularity of voting. However, IFOR's presence and its right to fully control the elections speaks for the fact that in this war all sides are losers. [passage omitted]

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[Kesic] Is the Serb Republic any closer to statehood or to the unified state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and how do you view the Serb Republic's future as a state?

[Kasagic] The state of Bosnia-Herzegovina exists on the basis of the Dayton accords. It has fewer jurisdictions than the former SFRY in the 1974 Constitution. However, international pressure is now inversely proportionate. Before, pressure was being exerted and support was being expressed for the disintegration of the SFRY, whereas today the pressure aims to revive and strengthen Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unified state. Which option will prevail I cannot say. The fate of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb Republic depends on this.

B-H: Serb Official Says Muslims Impeding Border Talks

LD2902113196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0915 GMT 29 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 29 Feb (SRNA)—Velibor Ostojic, the deputy prime minister of the Serb Republic and chairman of the Serb Republic commission for territorial settlement, told SRNA yesterday that the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's response to the Serb side's proposal on the correction of the entire border was inadequate and unsatisfactory.

According to Ostojic, the eighth session of the subcommittee for borders, which was held in Ilidza yesterday, was devoted almost entirely to the proposal for the correction of the entire border, which the Serb Republic state commission had presented to the Croat-Muslim side at the last meeting.

"Apart from giving an inadequate and unsatisfactory response, the Croat-Muslim representatives totally ignored proposals put forward by the Serb Republic commission for territorial settlement in some sectors, such as Posavina and Herzegovina", Ostojic said. He stressed: "If the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's commission continues with the practice of changing only what it wishes to, failing to take into consideration interests of the Serb side, the next round of talks in the subcommittee for borders, which is to be held on 1 March, might end up in failure." [passage omitted].

B-H: Serb Zvornik Authorities Demand Access to Villages

AU2802203096 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Zvornik municipal assembly has demanded that the command of the U.S. IFOR [Implementation Force] brigade make it possible for Serb police to enter the villages of Zaseok, [name indistinct], (?Bitinica), and Kovacevici, which are, in accordance with the Dayton accord, part of the Serb Republic.

The U.S. brigade command, which is in charge of the demarcation line from (?Memici) to Boskovici, was asked to abide strictly by the agreed [word indistinct] on the transfer of these villages.

The municipal committee for accommodation of refugees from Serb Sarajevo intends to accommodate a certain number of families in these villages.

B-H: Muslim-Croat Federal Police Enter Ilijas

LD2802193396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1832 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 28 (TANJUG)—Police of the Muslim-Croat Federation on Wednesday entered Ilijas, second Serb Sarajevo district which fell under the federation's control according to the Dayton Agreement.

Several tens of thousand Serbs moved out of the Serb part of Sarajevo on the eve of the takeover of their municipalities by the federation's force, for which the March 19 deadline was set. This accounts for another exodus of Serbs next to the expulsion of Krajina Serbs by Croatia last year.

Following the federal police's Friday entry into Vogosca, the first Serb municipality taken over by this police, international representatives drew attention to the federal policemen's unfair conduct towards the remaining Serbs and warned that such a conduct might make even them to leave their homes.

As the French AFP agency reported, U.N. Spokesman in Sarajevo Aleksandr Ivanko said that around 90 federal policemen were in Ilijas which is under surveillance of around 50 policemen from the international police force.

The AFP recalled that during the entry of federal police into Vogosca, U.N. officials promised that each federal policeman would be under control of two instructors of international police.

This promise was difficult to keep because the U.N. does not have a sufficient number of policemen, so that federal policemen could be seen in Vogosca streets while patrolling alone, said the AFP.

For this reason, the inverse proportion was applied in Ilijas: one international instructor oversees the performance of two local policemen.

The U.N. had planned to site 1,700 international force policemen in Bosnia, 470 of them in Sarajevo.

Many countries, however, had not responded to the U.N. request and had not sent out policemen to Bosnia.

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B-H: UN Police Forces, French IFOR Enter Ilijas

LD2902102296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0905 GMT 29 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ilijas, 29 Feb (SRNA)—The Muslim police this morning entered another part of Serb Sarajevo—the municipality of Ilijas.

The international forces headquarters in Sarajevo confirmed that members of the Muslim police accompanied by UN international police forces and French Implementation Force [IFOR] soldiers entered Ilijas shortly before 0900 this morning. [passage omitted]

The evacuation of the population from parts of Serb Sarajevo that are being ceded to the Muslim government is continuing.

B-H: 'Still Over 6,000 Mines' in Tesanj, Doboj, Teslic

AU2702180096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Feb 96

[Report by Mirudin Aldobasic on a meeting between representatives of the Nordic-Polish Brigade Press Center and journalists from Tesanj, Doboj, and Teslic in Tesanj on 27 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] There are still over 6,000 mines on the free territories of Tesanj, Doboj, and Teslic. This is unfortunately the weak point in the implementation of the Dayton agreement. True, all sides are doing their best, but owing to the lack of equipment and unfavorable weather conditions, the work is not progressing according to schedule. Moreover, there are still unknown minefields in the area which represent the greatest danger, Major (Arthur Galowski), the representative of the Nordic-Polish Brigade Headquarter's Press Center, said.

Four crossings have already been opened on the Tesanj-Maglaj route. It is now up to the civilian authorities on both sides to [words indistinct] to ensure freedom of movement for the local population. True, the issue of security on the roads will remain [word indistinct] for some time, because the Implementation Force guarantees freedom of movement, but not security. This means that the security on that side should be guaranteed by the local Serbs' police. This was stated at today's joint meeting between the representatives of the Nordic-Polish Brigade's Press Center and journalists from Tesanj, Doboj, and Teslic.

For the time being, the road to Teslic is open, and once the bridge at (?Karusa) is repaired, it will be possible to travel to Doboj by road.

B-H: Zenica-Doboj Cantonal Government Inaugurated

AU2802205696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 28 Feb 96

[Report by Dzemaludin Ramic from Zenica—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Although remarks with a party slant prevailed, 46 deputies present out of 59 deputies who form the assembly of Zenica-Doboj Canton were unanimous in casting their vote for a 13-member government that will head this sociopolitical community in the future. Bedrudin Salcinovic, prime minister-designate of the cantonal government and governor of the canton, proposed the following ministers: Franjo Petricevic, minister of industry, energy, and mining; Aziz Cosic, minister of agriculture, forestry, and water management; Salko Handzic, minister of trade and tourism; Danica Sajn, justice minister; Tevzija Babic, finance minister; Semsudin Mehmedovic, minister of internal affairs; Miroslav Pecinovic, minister of labor, social policy, and refugees; Kemal Celebic, minister of education, science, culture, and sports; Vedad Gradincic, minister of health; Ejub Salkic, minister of urbanism, town planning, and protection of environment; Amir Huseinbasic, minister of transport and communications; and Drago Vrbic and Zahid Trnkic as ministers without portfolio. The members of the government were immediately sworn in ceremonially. [passage omitted]

B-H: Zubak, Officials Discuss Federal Police Deployment

AU2802205396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak, Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation president, received a delegation from Kiseljak and Fojnica municipalities today, which comprised Josip Boro, the head of Kiseljak municipality; Mladen Tolo, head of the police administration in Kiseljak; and Miat Tuka, president of the Fojnica municipal council.

The delegation informed Zubak about the situation on the territory of the two municipalities. It was emphasized that there are a considerable number of Croat refugees from central Bosnia situated on the territory of Kiseljak; most of them, about 3,500, refugees from Sarajevo.

The members of the delegation expressed dissatisfaction with the organization of the police, which, presenting itself as the federal police, has assumed control in Vogosca municipality. A joint stance was that the above mistake should be corrected. It was concluded that the police, which will assume control in Ilidza, Hadzici,

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and in other municipalities that will become part of the federation, should be organized in compliance with the Rome Agreement.

B-H: Teslic Refugees End 'Peaceful' Demonstrations

AU2802194496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The peaceful demonstrations that expelled Teslic residents organized in Jelah near Tesanj today ended late this afternoon. Nearly 7,000 refugees from Jelah arrived at the entrance to Teslic, insisting that the Implementation Force officials strictly implement Annex 7 of the Dayton accord, which guarantees a safe return home. The Teslic residents did not enter their town today; however, it was agreed that the talks between the Bosniaks representatives from Teslic and the Serbs who live there will be held within the next 10 days. [passage omitted]

B-H: Sarajevo Serb Refugees' Status in Rudo Legalized

AU2702203796 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The refugee status of the people from the Sarajevo municipalities of Vogosca and Stari Grad, mostly accommodated in abandoned houses in Rudo, has been legalized.

It has been announced that they will not be evicted, a decision that has brought relief to the 130 families, since the electricity in their houses will be turned on again soon.

Since more evacuated people from Serb Sarajevo are expected to arrive, collective accommodation is being prepared in town, and over 30 abandoned apartments that the people of Rudo occupied during the war will have to be evacuated.

B-H: Silajdzic on Party Plans, Croat-Muslim Federation

BR2902154196 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 29 Feb 96 p 8

[Interview with former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Angel Santa Cruz in Sarajevo; date not given: "Silajdzic: 'Everything Is Divided Up According To Ethnic Criteria'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo—*Former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has moved from his austere official office here in the capital Sarajevo to a more conventional one in an office building where he is preparing a new centrist political career.*

With his status gone—but not his influence judging by the string of requests for interviews from journalists—the former Bosnian prime minister makes do with a personal secretary, an administrative assistant, and a bodyguard. He speaks tersely and deliberately with his characteristic air of being permanently exhausted.

[Santa Cruz] Why did you leave the government?

[Silajdzic] Because this system was starting to look like a poor copy of the former system. After all that has happened, Bosnia deserves the right to choose democracy. I think that democracy is very important for Bosnia. Because of our situation and our history we are a country of dissidents with an avant garde spirit that cannot be shackled.

[Santa Cruz] So is the governing party not democratic?

[Silajdzic] Not any more. The Democratic Action Party [SDA] was originally democratic, but a formation where the executive committee consists of generals, policemen, priests, businessmen, and so on, cannot be a democratic party.

[Santa Cruz] How is your relationship now with President Alija Izetbegovic and his new Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic?

[Silajdzic] Normal with both of them.

[Santa Cruz] Is your own party getting ready to compete in this year's elections?

[Silajdzic] I am working on it. It will be a centrist, democratic party whose aim will be the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I stress reintegration because what is happening on the ground at the moment is the opposite of that: it is a partitioning. In the federation (of Bosnian Croats and Muslims—EL PAIS editor's note) there are no cantons but rather national territories. I aim for liberty and democracy and those will be the main features of my party.

[Santa Cruz] Don't you think that liberty and democracy are excessively generic concepts on which to base the program of a party?

[Silajdzic] Of course, but at the moment we do not have anything better. The so-called democratic parties have opened a number of concentration camps in Bosnia. The Dayton agreements really offer a possibility for the reintegration of the country.

[Santa Cruz] Can you be more precise?

[Silajdzic] I am referring to the social, economic, and political structure of this country. Now everything is divided up according to ethnic criteria.

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[Santa Cruz] In the current state of affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are fairly representative elections really possible?

[Silajdzic] They are possible but it depends on how they are supervised and on the real freedom of the media. Despite the homeless, the refugees, the census, I think that there can still be representative elections. Freedom of information is very important for the elections. We have the so-called state media serving one or two parties, and other media elements with a very limited scope. For example, I have not had a chance to explain on state TV why I resigned as head of government even though I asked to be given this opportunity.

[Santa Cruz] Do you think that the SDA is a totalitarian threat?

[Silajdzic] It was precisely because it tends in that direction that I decided not to form a new government.

[Santa Cruz] Are the Dayton peace agreements being implemented satisfactorily?

[Silajdzic] Mostly they are, but it is very important for us to know whether we are working toward the integration or disintegration of the country. We are still only at the beginning.

[Santa Cruz] Will the federation with the Croats work?

[Silajdzic] There is no federation between the Croats and the Muslims. For the past two years the Washington agreement that created it has been constantly eroded. It is clear that the Croatian leadership does not want it. It is also clear that the Bosnian leadership is increasingly taking the same view.

[Santa Cruz] Can you be more explicit?

[Silajdzic] I have already said enough.

[Santa Cruz] Do Croatia and Serbia have territorial ambitions on Bosnia?

[Silajdzic] They say that they do not, but we are seeing the exact opposite on the ground.

[Santa Cruz] Do you have faith in the constitutional model agreed on for Bosnia, with a Croatian-Muslim zone and a Serbian zone?

[Silajdzic] I think it could work but it will need a lot of goodwill from all parties. The model could improve with time. However, the really important thing is for there not to be any territorial ambitions on Bosnia.

[Santa Cruz] In an interview you gave this newspaper last year you were very pessimistic. Now you are tending toward an idealistic stance.

[Silajdzic] It is up to you to decide whether I am an idealist or whether I just give that impression.

B-H: Silajdzic's New Political Impact Viewed

AU2802195596 Sarajevo AVAZOV FOCUS in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 96 pp 2-3

["Political analysis" by Nerzuk Curak: "Can Silajdzic Become the Master of the Opposition?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is a miracle that Haris Silajdzic is not idle while he is preparing to establish a new party. The former Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister has started his campaign pretty aggressively, both in the country and abroad, in order to win political, financial, and every other kind of support for a party of the democratic center, where, in his own words, he intends to situate his political party. His rather overt and uncompromising lobbying among the "green berets," popular founders of the defense of Sarajevo from the beginning of the war, has foreshadowed the possibility that Silajdzic will look for his electoral basis where Izetbegovic and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] are considered to be unbeatable, in the ranks of the Bosnian Army.

But Haris Silajdzic, immediately before his resignation, had made a far-reaching propaganda move at the farewell session of his cabinet. The general public certainly remembers that this "authoritarian democrat" adopted the law on the compulsory employment of demobilized soldiers, and in case that it is impossible, municipalities are responsible for taking care of those people by paying them wages in kind.

So, among soldiers he is remembered as the man who promised them existence (although he did very little during the course of his mandate regarding that question), and his immediate abdication upon that promise, in the distorted conscience of the poor nation, can be interpreted as the "removal" of a man who wanted to do something to take care of the soldiers.

From this move of Silajdzic, as well as from his presence at the formal assembly of the "green berets," one can discern a minutely detailed plan for the marketing of the party which is still to be established. His departure for Davos, to the World Economic Forum, and then for Paris proves that neither Silajdzic nor his foreign sponsors will leave anything to chance. So, let us see what actions this descendant of a respectable Sarajevo family might take at the beginning of his "war for democracy."

Many Good People

Every normal man should be happy to hear that Silajdzic is founding a political party. Empty talk that this act

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would jeopardize the unity of the Bosniak nation is nonsense, because the maturity of a nation is reflected precisely in its tolerance for diversity, in the political position which allows a spectrum of different opinions, unlike one-party unification which, as history teaches us, is the road to national disaster. After all, why would the fact that one Bosniak, whose name is Haris Silajdzic, is founding a party jeopardize the unity of the Bosniak nation? Does that mean that if I myself decided to found a political party, that it would jeopardize the unity of the Bosniak nation? No, and a hundred times no to the vestiges of communism in the conscience of this part of the Bosniak population which is looking for a safe haven in the lap of only one party.

From the democratic point of view, Silajdzic's clearly expressed political intention to establish a party should be acknowledged. However, the basic question is—what will this party offer to the electorate? Will this party also be famous for the high rhetorical theorizing characteristic of its founder, or, in turn, will the party surpass its founder and offer both programs and people who will not invalidate this party project with an easily promised speed, simply in order to take over?

The "political iftari" [as published] Silajdzic organized during the course of Ramadan has launched into the local political orbit some names which a former professor of the Pristina University is very interested in. Of course, it is hard to say precisely who of those quality people could join Silajdzic's party, but there is no doubt at all that the lobbying has seriously started.

Who Will Join Silajdzic

A source who wanted to remain anonymous says that Silajdzic has almost certainly won over diligent Hilmo Neimarlija, president of the Assembly of IVZ [expansion unknown], which is very indicative if correct. He also mentions Enes Karic, Enver Kreso (if a ministerial seat has not "bought" him), and some other businessmen and scientists. It also seems that there is not a small number of those who will be sympathizing with this party from a distance. Of course, there are some other names in the game, not only in Sarajevo, but also in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if there is anyone to be pointed out, as perhaps a trademark of this party, then it is the brilliant organizer and businessman Hamdija Hadzihasanovic, who will certainly be Silajdzic's strong player.

This man from Rogatica who is known in the business circles in Bosnia, but also abroad, as the "grand master of organization," is precisely the type of man who can compensate for Silajdzic's lack of talent for organization.

The greatest quality of this new Bosnian party, for which it is rumored that its name will be Bosnian Party, (although those better informed think that a democratic prefix will certainly not be omitted), could be precisely the people around Silajdzic, not Silajdzic himself. And that indisputably is the quality of this self-sufficient man: to attract like a magnet worthy people who make a mistake by thinking that he is more worthy than they themselves. However, in any case, they also have an interest in using his leading position for their own benefit, but also, let us hope, for the benefit of Bosnia. One could think of it this way: Silajdzic will gather around himself people better than himself, unlike Izetbegovic, who is surrounded by people for whom not even in a dream could one say that they are of better quality than this proud missionary of the Bosniak national epic. Although one cannot deny that Izetbegovic has several quality players on his first and second team, they seem to be too cautious to decide for some changes which could bring only improvement to the leading Bosnian party.

It is hard to predict in what way this will influence the election results.

What Is Best for Bosnia

Some U.S. assessments say that in the next elections Silajdzic and his party will win the largest number of votes (some 30 percent), which is supposed to imply the necessity of forming a coalition, because no party will have an absolute majority. However, one would sooner say that these are U.S. wishes, not political reality, regarding the fact that it is a public secret that Silajdzic is an American player. It is hard to estimate to what degree this means selling national dignity, but it seems it is inevitable, because the present situation in Bosnia is such that sometimes this country really looks like a U.S. satellite. Of course, for some citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina it is acceptable—and they will vote for the U.S. political option; for some citizens it is not acceptable and they will vote for some other civic parties, the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], and, naturally, the Party of Democratic Action, which tends to claim for itself all the values of the Bosniak nation. To make a clear and worthy step in that direction, the SDA lacks an utterly clear and transparent political strategy, which this party should obtain as soon as possible if it wants to win power again.

What is the best solution for Bosnia from the point of view of the offered political options?

In the modest appraisal of this author, the best political coalition for this "house of ashes" would be the one in

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which nobody will have a convincing advantage. Within such a coalition, it seems that a slight advantage of the SDA, from the point of national Bosniak interests, would be the best solution, but on condition that the party is not "theologized," although there were some such indications at the last session of the Main Board of this party. When I say something like this, I am primarily thinking of the Bosnian sector which is hypernationalist, and being informed about the history of political life in the Balkans, it is hard to say that Bosnia would, with a possible election victory of a non-nationalized opposition, gain any comparative advantage over its neighbors. Bosnia would probably be pampered and coddled in Europe and the United States, but there is not a long step from pampering to the creation of bosniak consciousness by, for instance, JUTEL [Yugoslav United Television]. There is no need to outline the consequences, because we have already seen them all.

The Left and the Former Prime Minister

The postwar situation and the horrible social crisis in which the bulk of the nation finds itself are excellent grounds for the progress of such leftist parties as the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and UBSD [Union of Social-Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina], but they will not use that because they simply have no strategy for the election basis, which belongs to them by definition. On the other hand, it would be disastrous, primarily for the Bosniaks, if the coalition of the left would win in the elections, because that would cause tectonic disturbances in the Bosniak national soul once again. Just as it has been released from the bounds of communism, this soul of ours would once again be detained in the leftist bottle of the lack of understanding the mosque, and that political game of hot-and-cold would only interrupt the historical flow of national emancipation.

Would Silajdzic be able to go into an election coalition with the parties of the left?

Although most Western analysts are convinced that it will happen at least between Silajdzic and Beslagic, it is hard to believe, because Silajdzic is far from the left, just like the SDA. But the basic question is: To whom is Silajdzic close?

Many are suspicious of his sincerity. In a statement for LE NOUVEAU QUOTIDIEN, one of the heads of the Helsinki Board for Bosnia-Herzegovina says: "Silajdzic or Izetbegovic, it is all the same. The only difference is that Silajdzic tells you what you want to hear." Here, that is what those who are supposed to be a consistent part of his election basis think of him. And one of the most distinguished Bosniak intellectuals, Dr. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, in a statement for the same paper, says: "Silajdzic had been on the side of authorities until he got thrown out. He must convince us that he really has changed. He must explain his political strategy. It is not enough to announce one's good intentions." Judging by this statement, and knowing how much both Silajdzic and Mahmutcehajic cannot resist vanity, it is hard to imagine that the two of them will join together, although such a possibility has also been rumored.

Bosniak Nationalism

When all the pieces of the Bosnian political puzzle are put together, it is impossible to avoid the question: Can Silajdzic become the master of the opposition? Lobbying by the Western centers of power for something like this supports the affirmative answer to this question. However, the West has been confirming day by day that it does not understand Bosnia.

TIME magazine, in its comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, "skins" the SDA, and although it considers the SDA far better than the HDZ and SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], nevertheless gives it the label of a nationalist party in the negative sense of that word, and it almost declares fundamentalism as the basic expression of Islam. Such radical excesses of the Western press can only strengthen the positions of those forces in Bosnia which insist upon the religious and national concept. However, the solution for Bosnia, and primarily for the Bosniak nation, is neither in this concept nor in the concept of non-nationalized secularity and partly disguised despotism and bonapartism. The solution for Bosnia is also not in the dictator-like understanding of democracy. The solution for Bosnia is, at least in these first years after the cataclysm, Bosniak nationalism with a civic background. However, this term is only to be checked.

B-H: Dayton Prospects Following Rome Summit Considered

AU2302201796 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 20 Feb 96 p 1

[Commentary by Zija Dizdarevic: "Responsibility"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Rome meeting intensified the responsibility for the implementation of Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement. One can talk about this responsibility in three groups. In the first, there are Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic, the major signatories of the peace agreement. Behind them, or more precisely, above them, there are the sponsors of the Peace agreement headed by the United States.

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In the third group there are the internal political forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their activity is very modest now. However, without them there can be neither a realistic peace nor a state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The sophisticated political debt-enforcer Richard Holbrooke has forced at least one more pledge to peace and respect for what had been agreed from Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic. The validity of this new agreement can be easily and quickly checked out. In addition to everything else, he has urged Milosevic to monthly meetings with Izetbegovic and the establishment of a hotline between them.

According to the new plan, the agreement on the reunification of Mostar comes into force today. Thus, Tudjman has also been put under real pressure. He, too, like Milosevic, has been threatened with political and economic sanctions once again.

The meeting in Rome has once again pushed the responsibility of the commander of IFOR [Implementation Force], U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith, to the center of attention. Recently, he and his people have been flexing their muscles on Mt. Romanija and Podgorjelica.

Smith has been given new important powers. He will estimate if those in the Serb Republic have so much (and so suddenly) improved that they deserve the suspension of the economic sanctions imposed against them. On the other hand, his hands are free to get the local Serbs into line militarily, if they continue to be disobedient in implementing the peace agreement.

In a well-known manner, Milosevic has transferred all the responsibility to Pale. After the talks in Rome, he said that the Bosnian Serbs should no longer oppose the implementation of the Dayton agreement. In addition, he expressed his satisfaction over succeeding in obtaining the possibility of having sanctions against them lifted.

Regarding that, the reaction of Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic is very interesting. He said on Pale television that the suspension of the sanctions enabled the establishment of economic trade with the FRY, but also within Bosnia-Herzegovina, so also with the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Does that mean that Kasagic is really becoming the leader of the idea in the RS [Serb Republic] to establish a political, economic, and any other kind of dialogue in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Four years ago, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was attacked from outside with support from within. It is possible to reestablish the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina once again, but first of all from within, with support from outside. It is time for action from the third group of those with responsibility.

B-H: Rome Summit Seen To Confirm Croatian Stands

AU2702105796 Zagreb VELEBIT in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 96 p 3

[Commentary by Bozidar Petrac: "Rome Removes Misunderstandings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Rome summit on the implementation of the Dayton agreement, all the participants gave unanimous support to its realization, and it is obvious that the world-famous historical saying, Roma locuta—causa finita [Rome has spoken, the matter is settled] can no longer work. All the participants of the meeting understand that peace in the region cannot be achieved merely by imposing it or by a shortcut, but by common understanding, talks, and compromise. Rome represented an essential shift in quality.

Only a couple of days ago it seemed as if it sufficed to "lecture" the Croatian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in Mostar, and then to transfer a good part of such behavior also onto Zagreb, and that thus the political differences would disappear in themselves. That is, Zagreb, just like the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, would have to accept the arbitration of Mr. Koschnick unreservedly, reconcile itself to the fact that they would not have more than barely a half of the town and its contents even in Mostar, and that they should reconcile themselves, under pressure especially of some factors within the European Union, to what one wanted to impose on them. Although those with a better insight into the situation were perhaps skeptical about the envisaged solutions, although some have even predicted that in the case of Mostar the whole solution would be tested—the survival and the affirmation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, some, nevertheless, have not succeeded in concluding that one cannot determine the future life of the Croats in Mostar—regardless of some procedures that cannot be approved at all, but which can be understood—by a mere move of one's pencil or by a decree, and at the same time not to give an opportunity to change at least one letter in the offered solution.

Upon his return from Rome, the president of Croatia described the newly arisen situation simply and unambiguously: According to the wishes of some European factors, one wanted to give a good shake, and even discredit all that had been achieved in Dayton, and signed in Paris, with the intention to discredit the self-will of the Croats, and to put all the blame for possible failure onto Croatia's back. Once again, one has to say that recently the international position of Croatia, as well as its role in respecting the Dayton agreement cannot be denied at all. Moreover, looking at the overall political

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picture in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, it is clear that precisely Croatia is an exceptionally cooperative factor, which has been trying, within some realistic possibilities, to achieve solutions that are not primarily set up in an egoistic way, but, on the contrary, are very much trying to think about the totality of different political interests that do not connect, clash, or intertwine in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as in the whole area of southeastern Europe. And today, after Rome and the meeting of all the relevant participants in solving certainly the largest European crisis since World War II, Croatia once again lets everybody understand it will not agree to everything one wants to impose on it or extort from it.

Consistent Croatian Stands

If, therefore, Croatia can precisely say that the meeting in Rome succeeded in removing some controversies advocated by certain European factors, having even tried to play the Dayton agreements down, that means that in the manifold competition of interests Croatia may face possible rivals and all those who obviously do not like the Dayton solutions. That is, from a multitude of political commentaries and statements of individual politically influential persons, the attempt to bring all the achieved solutions into question was more than apparent, to unilaterally or multilaterally—it is utterly irrelevant which—denounce as guilty those whom it is senseless to blame for moral and all other reasons, and, like in the BBC series, to put everything onto the same level, and from that level to proclaim them guilty before the whole world and condemn them in the name of the whole international community. Or some people particularly mind the consistency of the Croatian stand that Croatia will never accept some kind of union of Balkan, Adriatic, or some other combinations that certain international factors have not completely given up yet.

After all, what was the reaction of some foreign media on the Mostar events, what did those messages look like, and what was their aim within the framework of their own general public? Both Germany and Italy this time really played out a real media offensive on everything attributed to Croatia. Our media have shown a lot of it, by quoting certain papers, as well as the statements of some political officials. The German media have spoken up, in a really undiplomatic manner, about an "open quarrel" between the Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel and the Croatian side. The minister himself has made it known, so as to cross, in his arrogance, the Rubicon of good relations with Croatia, although during the talks with Croatian political leaders he could not have convinced himself of a Croatian stubbornness concerned only with its own spitefulness. One could sooner say—and that is evident from the attitude and measured statements of Croatian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mate Granic—that from his Croatian collocutors he [Kinkel] has received constructive suggestions that are not at all directed at the obstruction of Dayton, or the obstruction of the foundation and affirmation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the contrary, he has met the people who themselves, protecting the interests of the Croatian national corps in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly its equality and constituent quality in relation to the other two nations, have only been trying to achieve a solution that c ald also serve as a promotional solution to the Federation, as well as to appeasement in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the whole region.

Finally, Klaus Kinkel himself had to understand that regarding Mostar, the point in question is not Croatian supersensibility, but a gradual construction of the architecture of mutual confidence, and in this, nobody will remain in a subordinate position.

For Honest Solutions

The German minister of foreign affairs also had to understand that for some European reasons, for one reason or another, one cannot call into question the situation in Croatia itself—and Croatia wants nothing more than is considered in international relations as justified and satisfactory for all the interested parties. Even Germany itself, regardless of its interests, which are understandable, cannot ask Croatia for something that is outside any neutral international arbitration. This is also because (except for the open questions of Mostar) the problems regarding the animation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina must in no way be exhausted only on the Mostar problems. All the problems that put pressure on the affirmation of the Federation go beyond the Mostar area itself, and directly concern Sarajevo, but also some other Bosnia-Herzegovina neuralgic points. Sarajevo itself is not immune to essential questions that can directly or indirectly jeopardize the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina project, and all the good intentions of the Dayton agreements.

Apart from that, it is well-known that the Croatian side is hoping for a compromise in Bosnia-Herzegovina, anticipating direct negotiations of the Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If, however, it were only Mostar that one had to rack one's brains about, particularly as far as Koschnick's "criteria" are concerned, then it certainly would not bring about a solution to the crisis, which has obviously—and one must repeat it—been caused by some other political (European) factors. In the postwar circumstances, any question one raises

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insisting that, at any price, in Mostar (and Bugojno, or Sarajevo, or Usora, and so on) something has to be solved at the cost of one, or on behalf of another party, is bound to miss its basic target. Such an approach can neither achieve compromise, nor the realization of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina project, nor a lasting peace in the whole region, as is vaguely envisaged by Washington and Dayton.

Was the summit in Rome a mere darning of the truce and an attempt to return to Dayton principles? It is a hard question. The Croatian president, on his return from Rome, directly answered that some forces had tried—even through the open questions in Mostar—to undermine the Dayton and Paris solutions that had been achieved. Everybody must understand that, if they really want peace, a solution or an agreement cannot be reached that would be damaging—particularly for the victims of this war themselves. A certain sobriety in making decisions, decrees, and the arbitration itself must take care of this. Without sobriety, without a reasonable approach, without a compromise solution, there can be no peace at all. If peace occurs at the cost of any side, visibly, it cannot survive as a solution. Nor could Scandinavization, which has been discussed a lot, be carried out if it were not for the approach that could give everyone the same or at least approximately the same chances. Perhaps some of the international factors are not aware that not everything can be achieved by economic and financial injections alone, because you cannot just buy people, however much one's living standard and life security means to every man. Precisely because of that it is necessary to bear in mind all the elements inseparable from life, and after years and years of destruction, casualties, and war (and we would say of aggression and maniacal desire to steal our territories from us) to achieve a lasting and stable peace, a peace that will not be questioned once again tomorrow, or in a year or so.

Therefore, Croatia cannot unilaterally accept what the Defense Minister Gojko Susak, during his visit to the United States expressed: "They expect us to dictate to Mostar, however, we cannot do that. We can exert our influence upon them (the minister was thinking of the Croats in Mostar; author's remark) and we can try negotiating... However, we cannot dictate to them what to do."

Many things are said in an exaggerated manner, both in the foreign media and by the international politicians, and by a part of the domestic political stage. A little part of it can be taken as good and positive, although one cannot discard everything. However, one thing is absolutely sure: When the point in question is peace and the realization of the Dayton agreement, as well as of the basic agreement for the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem into the constitutional and legal order of the Republic of Croatia, one must always bear in mind that it is not a fast 100 meters race with or without hurdles, but a real marathon, in which the winner will not be the one best prepared, but those who know that one race, one marathon, cannot solve the crucial European problem at the end of the twentieth century. And the meeting in Rome was the confirmation of Croatian stands, which removed misunderstanding in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and, without a doubt, marked significant progress.

B-H: Commentary on Rome Conference, Serb Commitments

AU2602142296 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 96 p 5

[Commentary by Miodrag Vukmanovic: "The Hot Line"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the end of the Rome conference the official representative of the interests of all the Serbs with the international community, Slobodan Milosevic, made some of his proteges happy again with a special gift. After Dayton, Milosevic congratulated the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina on their republic, discreetly pointing out some of his merits as well. It was like a toast made by a devoted father at his daughter's wedding—fatherly wishes combined with discreet hints about the high costs, that can only be even higher if the marriage is not taken as an extremely serious matter. As something like that has just begun to happen, after Rome, Milosevic, in the typical manner of commercial pathos and affected optimism, announced the suspension of sanctions against the Serb Republic, as if it was the result of his diplomatic savvy, despite the fact that before the sanctions can be lifted certain conditions must be met and a precisely defined procedure followed, as in the case of FRY.

What is disputed between the Croats and the Bosniaks, and in what way their disagreements will be settled, can be seen from the documents achieved at the Rome conference. However, what the specific Serb commitments specified by the documents are is known to only a few. It is therefore assumed that the commitments are much more displeasing than one could possibly gather from the official version of the five adopted statements and agreements. (Serb commitments are here understood as Milosevic's superconstitutional authority, recognized by the international community as an authentic factor.)

The paramount problem for Milosevic and the Montenegrin authorities at the moment is the demands for

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extradition of former Yugoslav, and then Serb officers to the International War Crimes Tribunal. The insistance by some influential international factors that the Dayton accords are to be fully implemented, and the interest of the international community in precisely that criminal segment of the peace plan, deprive the accused and those who are not quite sure they will eventually escape justice of any hope that the Hague Tribunal will dissolve in time, either out of political or financial or any other reasons. Therefore, in the opinion of critics of the Hague Tribunal, and those who are known as opponents of the so-called meddling in our own business, one should be patiently inventing various excuses to dodge the extradition of the accused. One should not publicly refuse to cooperate with the Tribunal, but it should not be recognized as well. Rather, one should wait for some new circumstances to bring an end to this already somewhat boring, hollow story one day. Actually, Milosevic does not have much choice: Either he extradites Karadzic and Mladic to The Hague (others go without saying), or he will expose the country to even more severe pressure, including reimposition of economic and other sorts of sanctions, that is, new and complete international isolation. One should not forget that the reimposition of sanctions would find Serbia and Montenegro in a relatively worse situation militarily, psychologically and economically than before. A third option is also possible: Milosevic could make a firm promise to extradite the accused (perhaps he has already done so), but put off the fulfillment of his promise, relying on his only genuine ally—somebody else's discord.

General Tolimir, Mladic's deputy, obviously concerned about the fate of his arrested colleague, Gen. Djukic, avoided meeting with the commanders of other Bosnian and guest armies on the George Washington aircraft carrier, and thereby reportedly caused a dramatic situation. Few people find such a thing disturbing any longer. Nobody actually knows precisely in whose service the Bosnian Serb generals are, or what they are engaged in, just like their leading gang in Pale. At the moment Milosevic is accompanied by one Kasagic, as this season's prime minister, while tomorrow he will be replaced with some other guy, if the former accidentally shows weaknesses in his socialist orientation.

What was unimaginable until yesterday, is becoming reality, owing to the insolence of time and history. Twists are sometimes paralyzing. Take, for instance, the hot line between Milosevic and Izetbegovic, which was arranged in Rome with an undertaking to hold meetings in person at least once a month. Apart from this, it seems we are getting closer and closer to the settlement of the political enigma called Bosnia. In a year or two today's most vociferous advocates of its division will convert into the most vociferous advocates of its independence. Only it will be hard to listen to them saying they have been such since the very beginning. They just did not understand each other right. Such things happen.

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Croatia: Serbs Mistrust Erdut Accord Implementation

AU2802181996 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 27 Feb 96 p 9

[Report by M. Bunjac: "Local Authorities on a Slow Burner"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Will the implementation of the Erdut agreement and the peace plan for the Srem-Baranja region be successful and give planned results? That is, will the displaced Croats come back and the Croatian authorities be restored without Serbs leaving the region? Has the deadline for this endeavor (24 months) been set too ambitiously, and have all the important details been agreed to a great enough extent to avoid already numerous complications? Reluctance on the part of the United Nations and the United States to organize a mandate for reintegration and lagging implementation of the Dayton accords in Bosnia, and particularly in Mostar, have kept these questions open for quite a long time already, while the assumed answers, for the time being, support the pessimists' views.

Although the Erdut agreement was signed almost three months ago, preparations for its implementation have not been finished, and the ground is still being tested. Foreign diplomats interested in the situation are touring the region, gathering information, and are not hesitating to contact local people as well. Often they find themselves in a situation where they have to answer unpleasant questions persistently dodged by local politicians, even though it is predominantly their duty.

U.S. Ambassador to Zagreb Peter Galbraith appeared three times at public panels in Beli Manastir, Ilok, and Vukovar, and for the first time openly declared in front of curious people that it was a Croatian territory, and the reintroduction of the Croatian authorities would inevitably follow. Thereby he satisfied the local Serbs' curiosity, but at the same time, like a thunderbolt, stirred up their anxieties and dissatisfaction. His reassurances and guarantees that the observation of human and civil rights will be supervised by highest international institutions did not help much. Such public appearances and Galbraith's diplomatic interpretation of the transitional period challenged the Serbs' utmost limits of patience.

Senior UN administrator of the region Jacques Klein, less diplomatically, yet straightforwardly and using military rhethoric, presented his own view of how to get out of the current blind alley with the help of the economy. However, his promises that the dignity, rights, and safety of Serbs will be observed are mistrusted as well because here even the most benign mention of reintegration is felt to be a provocation. In addition, the local people still have a bad impression of him, caused by his reported appearance on the UN television in late January. A rumor spread that he had stated on this TV channel that his goal was to visit with the Croatian president the Croat-controlled bank of the Danube, and if he happened to be hindered by various renegade elements, he would immediately crush them by force.

Of course, the question is how professional and accurate the translation was, but the rumor is nevertheless spreading in Vukovar, and it is not difficult to assume that it could bring him into a similar situation as that of his Mostar-based EU colleague, Hans Koschnick.

His position and assignment, already delicate enough, were not made easier by the remark of General Dusan Loncar, that demilitarization does not actually mean disarmament. At a panel in Ilok in early February he also stated that demilitarization could be carried out only if Klein addressed the people through the media, and guaranteed their full security.

The atmosphere of expectation and uncertainty, like smoldering fire, is sustained by the fact that the entire power is concentrated in the Regional and Executive Councils and the negotiating team, where signs of discord and power struggle have been apparent for a long time.

All partisan activities are forbidden or frozen, while local assemblies have not met since August last year. Goran Hadzic, former president of the Republic of Serb Krajina and afterwards Borisav Mikelic's representative in affairs concerning the Srem-Baranja region, publicly criticized Slavko Dokmanovic and Milan Milanovic because of that. At a panel he even questioned their legitimacy, demanded elections and forming of a regional assembly. Pressed by these accusations Milanovic defended himself at the same panel by saying he did everything following Belgrade's suggestions.

This was perhaps good enough an explanation to appease Hadzic temporarily, but the very fact that in unclear situations the highest Serbian authority is called on for help speaks enough for relations between Serb leaders, and in some opinions even questions the fate of the peace project.

That is to say, any serious questioning of legitimacy endangers the status of the Erdut agreement, and in certain circumstances it may complicate the peace process as well. A similar method was already used in Knin and the Serb Republic, and the results are perfectly clear and indelible.

Whether the questions raised above will soon get positive answers depends chiefly on the intentions of

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the international community and the resolve of the most powerful world factors to implement that, but also on whether the recent appeal of the head of the regional authorities Drzajic to people to maintain wisdom, reason, and order will land on a fertile soil. Because what a group of leaders greedy for power and wealth makes complicated not even a group of 5,000 peacekeepers will be able to resolve, even if Jacques Klein leads them.

[Box, page 9]

UN Administrator for the Srem-Baranja region Klein visited Erdut last weekend and on that occasion stated that the creation of conditions for investment and opening of this region was a general interest.

"Plans for foreign investment in this region are ready, and will start as soon as demilitarization is carried out. I have already discussed this matter with the EU working group in charge of former Yugoslavia and officials of the Council of Europe, and they have confirmed that investment plans are finished and ready," Klein pointed out.

He also concluded that, in addition to Croatia and Serbia, Hungary is very interested in the opening of borders and investment in the region, which was confirmed during Klein's last meeting with Hungarian Foreign Minister Kovac as well.

Croatia: Serb Radio on Refugee Resettlement in Baranja

AU2802185096 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 26 Feb 96

[Unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Text] The evident success in the realization of the nationwide program for the settlement of refugees and displaced persons from the occupied parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] in Baranja confirms the right of the Serb people to live on the Serb land. There is no doubt that this program, which provides for the settlement of 5,000 Serbs, will not only be implemented, but will also strike gold and that we will see many more new households of Serb refugees than planned. The municipal authorities in charge of the realization of the program concluded that Baranja has the potential and has therefore opened its doors to all refugees who want to start a new life in this area. Thousands of refugees, women and children from western Slavonia and other Serb lands — after the unprecedented exodus and the Ustasha crimes against innocent civilians — have already formed their family nests in friendly Baranja. It was not easy, but solidarity, humanitarian aid, as well as every other aid from the state, and economic and other organizations, but the solidarity of the Baranja inhabitants most of all, have enabled the Orthodox refugees to be easily assimilated into everyday life and work. Baranja is again ready to receive more refugees and hence the interest in the settlement in the region. The latest results are a case in point: From 1 January until the present, Baranja received 2,100 refugees and displaced persons from Banija, Kordun, Lika, and other occupied RSK areas. All of them were granted refugee status in Baranja yesterday. More than 1,000 of them found permanent abodes, i.e. they were accommodated in available houses and apartments, while the rest of them are staying temporarily with their families or friends, as they will eventually also be given houses, farms, or apartments. The organized reception of refugees is under way in the recently opened reception center in Batina. Municipal authorities are considering the possibility of opening at least another two such centers in Baranja in the near future. For the time being, 54 persons are accommodated in Batina, and their stay is being financed by the municipal budget and humanitarian and other organizations. About 200 people — who are now living a life worth living in Baranja — have passed through the center since its opening. The harsh winter partly hindered the realization of the program for repairing and rebuilding houses and apartments, but, now that the weather is getting better, engineers and contractors plan to begin work in less than 10 days. Until then, and until houses and apartments are ready for use, the necessary building materials and money will come from the municipal budget, nearby Vojvodina municipalities, as well as from donors who want to give immediate and concrete help to our people who need it badly.

Croatia: Alleged Spy Sentenced in Beli Manastir

AU2802162696 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 28 Feb 96 p 15

[Unattributed report: "A Spy Convicted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar — The chairman of the department of Court Martial in Beli Manastir, Dragan Dasic, stated yesterday that Milan Musa from Knezevi Vinogradi has been sentenced to eight years' imprisonment because of the criminal act of espionage for Croatia. He is now in the prison in Beli Manastir.

It was established that Musa had been collecting data on the disposition of units, armament, commanding staff, and other matters regarding the Slavonia-Baranja Corps, that is, the Baranja Division, and forwarding all the data to his contact in Hungary, to where he used to travel quite frequently to visit his sister and brother.

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Croatia: Article Supports Decision on JNA Succession

AU2802211396 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 24 Feb 96 p 19

[Article by Frane Plancic: "F-16's and Leopards Instead of 'Russian Iron'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ever since it victoriously ended the war with Operation Storm, and particularly since Washington implied a speedy membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, Croatia is faced with new, decisive decisions on national security and its authentic contribution to European stability and security.

VECERNJI LIST has exclusively learned that one such decision is that Croatia will relinquish its portion in the succession of the property of the destroyed Yugoslav People's Army [JNA]. This portion has been assessed to be worth over $84 billion!

Of course, Croatia will not relinquish a single dollar of this sum. Only under strictly defined conditions will it be ready to relinquish the process of endless fruitless negotiating, bargaining, and Serbian blackmail. The first and most important condition is the principle of compensation for the non-division of the arms, equipment, real estate, industry, and scientific research work, worth billions of dollars, which Serbia illegally appropriated. The other condition is that everyone should adhere to the (for the time being secret) Draft Succession Contract drafted by an European Union working group.

When simplified, this means that the negotiations have definitely failed, Croatia is going to join European military integration, where the outdated Russian-Serbian arsenal would mostly be a burden, while through compensation, the Croatian Army will acquire modern and appropriate arms, equipment, and train its personnel.

Susak's Mission

A political basis for this type of solution has been in preparation for a long time. It received an extremely important impetus and was almost completely defined during Croatian Defense Minister's Gojko Susak's recent visit to Washington. However, none of this is going to happen in an inappropriate way overnight. It is a process that requires a little more time.

Our public will use the time to assess the courage, purpose, and profitability of the decision to relinquish the property of the former JNA. We should not dwell too much on the wisdom of this decision. It was made as part of the strategy of Croatia's imminent membership in West European military-security integration. In the long run, no other decision was possible. Moreover, from the standpoint of victor in the war, any different decision could burden us with a sinister past — that is, it could maintain links from the past which would most certainly be reestablished with Serbia, and which neither we nor Europe want any longer.

It is a paradox, but true nevertheless, that Serbia should be grateful to us for this generous and victorious stance. From the point of view of Milosevic's strategy, it would have been better for it had it "given in" to Croatia and, through negotiations on the succession of the former JNA's property, burdened us with Russian iron, thereby making us technologically dependent — along with endless negotiations — on standards quite inappropriate for NATO. Moreover, we would have to limit the number of tanks and other heavy weaponry as specified by the Dayton Accord or the Vienna negotiations under OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] auspices. It would be much more difficult for us to extricate ourselves from this, and it would also be costlier. However, the war against Croatia was in itself a shortsighted decision. In the same way, the general, political strategy of creating a Greater Serbia is blind and does not see beyond its nose. The future Serbian democratic regime should muster the courage to thank us for pointing out the right way.

Long-Term Assessments

This represents the basic purpose behind Croatia's decision to relinquish its claim. We need to add that from the military-security point of view, this purpose, the main objective, can be achieved not only through the already-mentioned content, but also through a form that is appropriate to the new security order in Europe. [sentence as published] This form is the diplomatic and every other form of Croatia's contribution to a faster and successful resolution of Croatian-Serbian relations. [sentence as published]

Although it may seem that the criteria of courage and purpose of this Croatian decision are too abstract and less important than the criterion of profitability, we still need to list them as first, because these are essential criteria for a modern understanding of the military-security position of a state that is about to form an alliance with Western Europe, which has a project of security and stability for a period lasting well into the 21st century.

Of course, the criterion of profitability is unavoidable. It can be approached in a hundred ways, but all of them have to be linked to the other two criteria.

A simple example of what we are facing in our everyday understanding of profitability immediately springs to mind. Everyone will immediately accuse Croatia of

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making the wrong decision, because its absolute priority must be to achieve in any way possible that Serbia has the least possible amount of offensive arms left. This is an understandable stance, one generally accepted in logic that upholds the view that I will be better off if my neighbor's cow dies.

Succession and Compensation

However, in civilized neighborly relations, I will be better off when my cow is safe from the disease that has struck my neighbor's herd. Therefore, Croatia will be better off armed with fighter bombers like the U.S. Hawk, and tanks like the German Leopard, and equipped with modern systems, and when its troops are trained to act together with the allies in the defense of allied and individual security.

Nevertheless, there are questions pertaining to the profitability of relinquishing succession which will have to be solved through some other combination of succession and compensation methods. For an unspecified future period of time, Croatia will not be able to tolerate the disproportion in the number of maritime forces. It would be wise to pull out from Montenegrin ports the fleet illegally appropriated by the former Yugoslav Navy, and either divide or neutralize it. What will the (future independent) Montenegro do with four rocket frigates? Croatia is laying claim to two of these four large and still usable warships of the former Navy. Therefore, it must either get them (Slovenia should also get one), or all four should be turned into scrap.

This is preferable to having Croatia build or buy new large warships as a response to the threat from Boka, which would drain it financially (an even worse scenario), or to have it initiate a new round of the armament race in the already unstable southern NATO region.

This lesson is valid for Croatia's comprehensive effort to establish its security through an alliance with NATO, and it is valid for NATO to strengthen its security on Croatian soil.

[Box 1, p 29]

One Worth Five

According to alliance logic as the multiplier of individual forces, we come to unexpected conclusions and calculations.

For example, when the Croatian Army, as an associate or full NATO member, has one Leopard-2 tank, this tank is worth five Serbian T-72/M-84 tanks. Moreover, when protected by the alliance, the Croatian skies will be dominated by 20 Croatian Hawks, and F-16 fighter bombers, as opposed to some 100 Serbian MiG-21's and 20 MiG-29's. This relation is at the same time illustrative — to stress the value of partnership — but it is also realistic on the battlefield, which has been demonstrated in allied wars against individual, lone countries.

In other words, the numerical ratio of forces, when used as the exclusive or only criterion, can lead to completely inaccurate conclusions.

Croatia: New Assistant Defense Minister Appointed

LD2802122296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of Article 42, Paragraph 2 of the State Administration Law, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, has passed a decision appointing Josip Jurak as assistant minister of defense in charge of the civilian sector.

Croatia: General Strike Announced for 'Around' 20 Mar

AU2902111796 Paris AFP in English 1107 GMT 29 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb 29 (AFP) — Croatia's main trade unions Thursday [29 February] said they would call a general strike in the middle of March and would hold a referendum next week to back claims for a higher minimum wage.

Dragutin Lesar, president of the Society of Independent Unions of Croatia, said the general strike would be held "around March 20". He did not say whether the strike would be indefinite.

Croatia: AFP on Trade Union Strike Plans

AU2902095996 Paris AFP in English 0914 GMT 29 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb 29 (AFP) — Croatia's main trade unions were set Thursday [29 February] to announce a decision on plans to launch a general strike, the first in Croatia since it gained its independence from Belgrade in 1991, union officials said.

The Society of Independent Unions of Croatia [SSSH] met in Zagreb Wednesday to decide on the call by union leaders for an all-out stoppage in support of the unions' claim for an increase in the state's minimum wage and changes in state negotiating practice.

"Our meeting was a success," union president Dragutin Lesar said. A decision would be announced at a press conference Thursday morning, he added.

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Earlier Wednesday, a senior official of the SSSH, Hasim Bajtari, told AFP: "We intend to announce an all-out strike and possibly demonstrations across Croatia to coincide with it."

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has criticised the idea of a general strike as "not democratic" and described it as "the work of people wanting to overthrow the democratically elected Croatian authorities."

The unions are demanding an increase in the minimum wage and a change in the way wages in the dominant public sector are negotiated.

Strikes in former communist Croatia have been rare since it declared independence from Belgrade in 1991. A bloody rebellion by Serb separatists, launched in 1991, ended in August last year.

Croatia: Union Leader Sets Out Demands

AU2902131896 Paris AFP in English 1249 GMT 29 Feb 96

[Report by Veronika Radovcic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb 29 (AFP) — Croatia's main trade unions Thursday [29 February] said they will call a general strike next month, the first in Croatia since it gained its independence from Belgrade in 1991 launching four years of war with Serbia.

The unions, who will organize a referendum next week to back their demands, would be ready up until March 15 to meet with Prime Minister Slatko Matesa to discuss the claims.

Otherwise, the general strike would begin "around March 20," said Dragutin Lesar, president of the Society of Independent Unions of Croatia (SSSH).

He refused to say whether the strike, which would affect the entire Croatian public sector covering 80 percent of Croatian businesses, would be indefinite or limited to one or more days.

Lesar said he hoped to get 400,000 people to sign the referendum backing seven claims for a high minimum wage and changes to a range of laws governing salary negotiations and social costs.

He said the unions were demanding changes to the laws governing privatisation and changes to the tax system, which he said were too heavily weighted against employees and in favour of employers.

Lesar said the unions would send an open letter calling for the resignation of Labour Minister Joso Skara.

The general strike, if it eventually takes place would be the most significant sign of rising social discontent since the Serb rebellion in Croatia was crushed last August.

The SSSH had earlier this month said it would call a strike for this week but backed off from its call at the last minute.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, who knows he cannot dismiss social discontent lightly after his rightwing ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party scored a weaker than expected victory in legislative elections in October, has attacked the strike plans.

The strike "is the work of people wanting to overthrow the democratically elected Croatian authorities," he said at the weekend.

Government ministers have meanwhile dismissed the unions' claims as "unrealistic" and liable to "wreck the state's budget."

The government three years ago introduced a programme of drastic economic reforms and has been praised by international financiers for its control of inflation, currently running at around four percent.

Western analysts said last year that the economy was set to grow in 1996, for the first time since 1991. The kuna is stable against the German mark, and the government deficit has been kept down.

Unemployment, on official figures, stands steady at around 17 percent but the average salary in June 1994 was just 331 German marks a month.

The unions, however, point out that the government can expect to benefit this year from a "peace dividend" of returning tourist revenues and a cut in defence spending which between 1991 and 1995 accounted for some 30 to 40 percent of spending.

"It is to be expected that the government will try to protect the budget, but the problem is that budget has been allowed to go over spending in lots of areas," said Bozo Kovacevic, a leader of the opposition Social Liberals (HSLS).

Meanwhile, a rail union leader said Croatian rail workers went back to work Thursday, ending a seven day strike that had all but halted rail traffic in the country.

Strikers returned to work after union officials agreed to a government offer of a 30 percent increase in salaries, union leader Zlatko Pavletic said.

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FYROM: Serbian 'Theatricals' Over Recognition Viewed

AU2902120496 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 28 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Nevenka Mitrevska: "Theatricals Over Recognition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Another EU ministerial council has come and gone, and the Union has not normalized its relations with the Serb-Montenegrin federation, nor has Belgrade found it necessary to fulfill the last condition for it to do so — to normalize its relations with Skopje. According to information from Brussels, the foreign ministers of the Union's 15 member states did not even discuss the establishment of relations with Belgrade on Monday. The current chairman of the Council of Ministers, Italian minister Susana Agnelli, clearly repeated why: because Serbia has not fulfilled even the minimum condition — mutual recognition with the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — FYROM].

The delays that official Belgrade is creating are puzzling for a number of reasons. Of all the conditions in the Dayton agreement for its "comeback" to the international community — recognition of all the states formed after the collapse of former Yugoslavia, normalization of relations with them, the beginning of serious democratic changes inside the country, respect for human and minority rights, cooperation with the Hague tribunal on war criminals, and so on — recognition of the Republic of Macedonia seems to be the easiest to fulfill. There are no really serious problems between the two states. The agreement regulating mutual relations was drawn up two weeks ago. The document was, as we have been informed, finally coordinated, "stapled," and only waiting for the official signature.

That is to say, the document is waiting for Belgrade to show an interest in signing it, since Skopje is interested and does not hide the fact. This formal act, which would not cost Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic anything, would, in fact, help him realize three goals. It would affirm his sincere orientation towards peace in the Balkans, fulfill the minimum condition for a group normalization of relations with the EU at large, and open the way to his country's return to all international organizations and financial institutions.

"We do not see any reason that there should not be, or obstacles in the way of, mutual recognition and normalization of the relations with FRY," Macedonian officials say, and Belgrade representatives literally echo these words. However, if there are no obstacles, it is obvious that there are some calculations. Before the end of last month and the beginning of this one, (when the Ministerial Council usually convenes) Belgrade tried to involve the Union in these calculations and cheat Macedonia in the process. At that time, if you recall, precisely on the day when the EU ministers' meeting started, the Belgrade government reviewed and approved the agreement on the normalization of relations with Macedonia early in the morning, announcing it publicly through its agency TANJUG. The message to Brussels was supposed to be: There, you see, we have met the condition you asked for, and the only thing left now is the placing of the signatures, which is a pure formality. However, the EU saw through this scam. This time, in the wake of February 26 and the new ministerial council, Belgrade made another attempt with a similar 'con." First, it took advantage of the Macedonian Socialists' delegation, giving it wide media coverage, to show that the relations between the two countries are literally normal. Then, the head of the delegation, after returning to Skopje, full of euphoria, told us how he had had a nice "chat" with Milosevic, that the Macedonian-Serbian recognition and normalization of relations had all but taken place, and that, imagine, it would be done under Macedonia's constitutional name! (As if the name had ever actually been a problem, and now, thanks to the efforts of the Socialist Party of Macedonia and the good relations with Milosevic, that question had finally been taken off the agenda!). The misinformation released by the Belgrade agency BETA last Friday (which, it was not difficult to figure out, had come from official sources) caused so much excitement and misled a part of the Macedonian media, suggesting that Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic was allegedly in Macedonia to sign the agreement (but the Macedonian leadership, for who knows what reason, is hiding this from its own public). This was the height of the equivocally Macedonian "good-neighborliness," and the EU's not very honest diplomatic-media game. The Union was not deceived this time either. But there is a big difference between the end of January and the end of February. There is the decision France made in the meantime to unilaterally normalize relations with the FRY, regardless of the fact that the latter did not fulfill even this minimum condition of the Union. Belgrade is now hoping that, one by one, the other members of the Union will follow France's example, without its having to fulfill any conditions in return. Unofficially, Brussels diplomatic sources say that this time Serb diplomats explained the delay with the "problems" that Macedonia had had over its government reshuffle.

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So much for the unconvincing theatricals performed in front of the world. However, they have certainly not been in vain, and in this case, it looks a bit like someone's (European) moment, in the sense "do not hurry with Macedonia that much."

Milosevic knows that a lot more hard bargaining and deals lie ahead of his country on its way to the international community. Therefore, it is not a bad idea for him to hold on to as many trump cards as possible. Macedonia cannot serve as a trump card in the ploys over the position of the Serbs in Bosnia and the status of eastern Slavonia, but it could be of use in the upcoming negotiations "and expected pressure from outside" over Kosovo and the rights of the Albanian minority there, because Milosevic was the one who once took away Kosovo's autonomy, and now he is certainly not too thrilled with the idea of going back over all again to the 1974 Constitution. He is going to make a very hard bargain before making even the smallest concession.

It would be pleasing indeed, both for Macedonia and for peace in the southern Balkans, if Belgrade proves these presumptions wrong by signing the agreement on the normalizaton of Macedonian-Serbian relations.

FYROM: Opposition's Role, History, Potential Viewed

AU2902111996 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 28 Feb 96 p 3

[Commentary by Zoran Petrov: "Authority's Consciousness Back on Scene"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the most important cornerstones of democracy and the so-called parliamentary corrector of authority is the parliamentary opposition. Its real duty depends on the basic regulation of internal parliamentary relations, on the democratic traditions of the state, from which the so-called informal, but truly significant, influence of the opposition is derived, and primarily on its ability, competence, and internal cohesion in expressing its own views. Actually, the term is of Latin origin (opposition) and it indicates the real essence of opposition, which means contrast, difference, counter-action, competition, obstacle, denial, counter-arguments, and so on. In policy, it is the party that acts contrary, differently, or in contrast to another party.

In this context Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — FYROM] pluralism can boast its own experiences in parliamentary opposition and this question came to the fore with the recent political conclusions in the hitherto most influential ruling coalition, from which the Liberal Party was excluded and directed to the opposition benches in parliament.

Initial Experiences

Although with the 1990 elections the Macedonian Assembly had differentiated parliamentary groupings — VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] had 38 seats in parliament, the SKM-PDP [League of Communists of Macedonia-Party for Democratic Changes] that was later transformed into SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] had 31, the PDP-NDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity-People's Democratic Party] coalition 22, the Alliance of Reformist Forces of Macedonia, which was subsequently renamed the Liberal Party [LP], had 17, the Socialist Party [SP] 4, and so on, Macedonian parliamentary life began without a classical ruling party and without a classical opposition. Regardless of the necessity for the formation of an expert government (whose vital achievements were the preparations for the constitution and the law on defense), soon its instability became obvious because it lacked permanent parliamentary support. So, in some situations, or on concrete occasions, the parliamentary groupings were either supporting or criticizing the same government, which led to the expected outcome — the expert government was given a vote of no-confidence in the summer of 1992. Matters slowly settled down with the formation of the first political government in September the same year. In fact, this was a new experience — the political coalition of SDSM, PDP, LP, and SP for the formation of the government, after which VMRO-DPMNE, the largest party at that time, became the parliamentary opposition. The established differentiation among the parties in parliament represented a new experience in the actual meaning of opposition, it opened questions related to the profile, forms, methods, and limits in the activities. On the other hand, the parliamentary party of the VMRO-DPMNE essentially and formally opened the page of parliamentary opposition on several occasions because of the political capacity of its personnel and because of its methods that sometimes approached the limits of obstructions. Normally, this represented a valuable experience, particularly in relation to the strategic and platform orientation of the party in opposition, as well as with its personnel, which became competent in criticizing the authority. Finally, opposition is a big marketing challenge by itself, and if it is appropriately applied, it gains credit for each subsequent parliamentary election.

Commitment and Chance

A backward step in our parliamentary democracy was taken at the second parliamentary elections in 1994 because of the boycott of a part of the VMRO-DPMNE's and the Democratic Party's electoral body.

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The election coalition "Alliance for Macedonia" was thus given an additional chance for a great election victory (with its 87 members of parliament) and with the inclusion of the PDP (10 members) as a participant in the executive power, the parliamentary majority reached the fantastic five-sixths of the total number of members in the Macedonian Assembly. It is clear that in such a division of forces the percentage of the opposition, which consisted of some political parties and independent members, was only 16, and therefore it was pushed out to the margins and it could not act as a political rival or opponent, let alone a controller or corrector to the authority.

Finally, matters regained the same logic after the latest government reconstruction, which excluded the Liberal ministers, transforming this party into a political opposition in parliament. The new experience is with the collapse of the "Alliance for Macedonia" ruling coalition, the LP is given a new status, which is essentially different from the VMRO-DPMNE's opposition in the former parliament. Its 29 members of parliament have a big commitment, but also a chance, to demonstrate all their skills and individual qualities not only by criticizing the authority, but first of all by imposing its proper party views and arguments on some political or economic issues in the state.

This is the reason why the dilemma of whether it is an advantage or a handicap to be in parliamentary opposition is to be defined in the further work of the Macedonian Assembly, which now has a different profile. The commitment of the parliamentary majority is equal, if not greater, because they will now have a competitor that is organized in an opposition party, with its own platform and directions for future activities as a new opposition. Actually, the Liberals have a respectable quantity of members, we will have to wait and see their quality.

FYROM: Interethnic Ties on Tanusevci Border Examined

96BA0086A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 15 Dec 95 pp 20-21

[Article by Vladimir Jovanovski: "Uncle Dayton from Tanusevci"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *While the post-Dayton peace cycle is progressing, the population of Tanusevci, a village in the folds of the Skopje Crna Gora Mountains is trying to get to its fields, which have remained on the other side of the border. Will Paris, London, and Bonn pay attention to the difficulties of the Tanusevci people?*

Disagreements between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia about their border have a history almost as old as our state independence. Between shorter or longer intervals, the Serbian side has been continuously raising this issue, depicting itself as a country that has lost part of its national territory. This has led to banditry and murders, followed by statements made by some generals contesting the legitimacy of "80 percent of the border," and so on. This includes the case of the severe wounding of the young Bajram Satjiri from Tanusevci village, who was fired at by Serbian soldiers with automatic weapons, allegedly for having illegally crossed the border.

Of late, the problem of the Macedonian-Yugoslav border appears to have reached its final stage. Despite all obstructions and stipulations of Slobodan Milosevic, the reciprocal recognition by the two neighboring countries has assumed historical and political inevitability. It is not clear whether this will take place in Paris, Bonn, or elsewhere. However, it must take place, for all the reasons for postponing such a step have already been eliminated and, furthermore, the great powers are pressuring us. The Dayton Treaty confirms their firm desire.

Tanusevci, the place the PULS crew found most suitable for testing the Dayton-Paris reflections of the Macedonian-Yugoslav border relations, is our most advanced northern territorial point. Neither the police nor the army nor even UNPREDEP, whose unit is charged with controlling that section of the border, is located closer to the border as is that small mountain village. The village is so close to the border that the Serbians claim that part of it belongs to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs do not recognize the old border, which follows the river at the foot of the mountain, and claim that the border should run along the hill where Tanusevci is located.

Although it is under the jurisdiction of the Cair Skopje township, the distance from it to Tanusevci is longer than that from Paris and Versailles. It took almost four hours for our crew to reach the village, the same amount of time it would take to drive from Kumanovo to Gevgelija and back.

To help the readers orient themselves, Tanusevci is found in the folds of Skopje Crna Gora, on its northern slope. This means that in order to reach it one should cross the entire mountain which is neither small nor low. It is necessary to go though the Pobozje and Brodec villages. The first half of the road is paved. After that, it turns into an uneven track of mud and snow along which the powerful Lada, driven by Trajanco from the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] frequently became stuck or went out of control. Conversely, the

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effect of the harsh hillocks and the car sickness they provoked, and the spectacular "Himalayan" vistas of the mountains around us was entirely different. One can almost forget that, in this Mediterranean and almost subtropical Macedonia, such fascinating snow-covered vistas are possible, familiar to us only from photographs of alpine skiing areas.

Thanks to the road-building equipment, the road to the UNPREDEP post is open and passable. However, it stops at the post. From that point, occupied by the "blue helmets" to Tanusevci, the distance is five or six km of a steep path, icy and full of holes. We tried to cover it by jeep. However, at the very start, the Lada became so deeply stuck in dirty mud that we barely managed to get out. We continued on foot. This was quite a problem. The first part, the steep area, was icy ("Ouch, I hurt my back!," "Ouch, I hurt my rear!"); the second part was muddy like a Kicevo Street.

Somewhere midway, we meet with Mr. Feriz Ibrahimi, a 28-year-old villager from Malino, Kumanovo township, who was also going to Tanusevci to buy a cow. Some 12 km separate Malino from Tanusevci, a distance which the young Feriz could cover without any problem on foot, compared to the difficulty of covering it by car. In order to travel by car he would have go through Kumanovo and Skopje, for which he had neither money nor time. Feriz is a shepherd ("I have seen wolves grab a sheep and run more than 100 times") and is still a bachelor. We asked him whether, in addition to a cow, he did not have in mind to take also one of the beautiful Tanusevci girls (marriage between young people from those villages on both sides of the border is frequent), but he categorically stated that he was too young to marry.

After more than an hour on foot, we reached the village. Tanusevci consists of 93 houses with a population of 964. It is divided into several parts occupying the surrounding hills and the open area. It looks like a storybook village, with its small houses, fenced yards, and strong, proud but gentle mountaineers. At the entrance of the village, Feriz pointed to us the place where, 18 months previously, a tragic event had occurred. The unfortunate Bajram Satjiri wanted to drink some water from an improvised tap near the main village road. Instead, he was shot several times in the back. With the help of AN [expansion unknown] he was taken to Skopje, where he barely managed to survive. Since then, he has been unwilling to return.

The road which the Serbs claim as their border crosses the village itself. Since, in such a case, some of the houses would be on Yugoslav territory, the water main which supplies the area and the village school would remain on the Yugoslav side. Tanusevci's mayor or, more specifically, the chairman of the local assembly, Mr. Ismail Ibrahimi, told us that two years ago a Yugoslav army captain with his unit entered the village, broke the school door, and told the locals that the school will house a Serbian patrol. Since then, there have been continuing incidents. "There is virtually no person here who has not been mistreated by the Serbian soldiers. They not only beat us up but also shoot at us. We report all cases to the Macedonian authorities at the township, state, or governmental levels. They only shrug their shoulders and tell us that even if Serbia would recognize us they cannot help us. Some have even advised us to move. But where would we go?" Mr. Ibrahimi bitterly asked. Our amateur guide Feriz, from Malino, confirmed that he himself has been a target of Serbian border treatment. He was tricked by one of the border guards, apparently a gypsy, who allegedly wanted to purchase a sheep from his herd. However, the moment he crossed the line, he was immediately tied up and taken to the post, where he was severely beaten up. "They beat me for ten hours and then let me go," said Feriz, displaying a type of indifference we failed to understand.

The name of the "disputed" school in Tanusevci is Mihail Gramena. It is attended by 170 children in eight classes, from the first to the eighth grades. The teachers welcomed us hospitably, offering us Russian tea, and openly discussed the problems of their fellow villagers. Redzep Ibrahimi, a mathematics instructor, told us that, despite the idyllic picture of the village, here life is hard and difficult. This applies particularly to winter, when access is blocked and when the only means of locomotion is the tractor. During that time of the year, there are frequent interruptions of electric power, which affects the Tanusevci people most harshly. "Sometimes we have remained without electricity for several months," complained Redzep. The great poverty and hard life in the village, where one could gather in only two small stores (there is no coffee shop), forces the people of Tanusevci to move to in Skopje or its surroundings. It is being said that at least 300 houses built by people from Tanusevci may be found in Aracinovo, Singelec, and Dizonska, or three times the number of houses remaining in the local community.

On top of everything else, after the breakdown of Yugoslavia, Tanusevci found itself on the border line, and some of its fields and meadows remained in another country. If they want to plow or mow on their own land, they are mistreated.

Adem Satjiri is an older cousin of Bajram, the person we mentioned, the youngster who was shot by Yugoslav border guards. Like his relative, he has experienced what happens when one "illegally" crosses the state

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border. Here is what Adem told us: "I intended to mow the meadow which is 400 meters from my house, on Macedonian territory. All of a sudden I was attacked by two Serbian soldiers who tried to tie me up. They succeeded with the help of third. I was taken to the post where I was asked about the type of weapons and vehicles the AN people used, how many people serve in the Macedonian army post, what the Americans are looking for in Macedonia, and so on. They beat me nonstop. Then, a lieutenant and a major arrived. They began by taking my money and then joined in the beating. Finally, I was tied to a stake as they had done to the AN personnel in Bosnia. Twenty hours later I was taken to a court house in Vitina. In order to free me, my relatives had to pay 3,000 German marks to the soldiers and the court. Finally, after some 30 hours in captivity, I was released to return to Macedonia."

Many such cases have occurred, although of late not so frequently. We do not know whether this is the result of the cold weather and the thick snow that prevents the border guards regularly to patrol the area or whether some kind of signal has been given to ease the pressure. In any case, the weather and the general life of poverty in Tanusevci at this point torment the local population more than the unresolved territorial demarcation between the two neighboring countries.

On television, most people in Tanusevci watch the entertainment-musical programs broadcast by the Skopje and Tetovo television studios. With rare exceptions, such as Imer Dzaferi, the person who drove us to our disabled Lada, and who, because of his interest in world politics, has been nicknamed Aldo Moro, most villagers are not interested in political events on earth. They have little information about events at the Wright Paterson base, the signing of peace agreements at the Abbe Rojamont Castle in Paris, the London Conference, or the Bonn Summit. The participants of these events, the peacemakers and the Balkan politicians, are even less familiar with the difficulties experienced by the Tanusevci villagers, relative to mowing their meadows and digging their potatoes. Still, Clinton, Milosevic, Crvenkovski, and the other participants in the post-Dayton global caravan may, perhaps with the help of some mysterious tarot channels, have developed a link with Adem and Bajram Satjiri, Dzafer "Aldo Moro," and the remaining population of this small forgotten village. Versailles is truly far from Tanusevci.

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Poland: Rosati Rules Out Transit Corridor Across Country

LD2802180996 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1715 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 28 Feb—Foreign Affairs Minister Dariusz Rosati confirmed today that the proposal to build a [transit] corridor from Kaliningrad to Belarus via Polish territory was unacceptable.

There is no chance for any such corridor, and there are several reasons for that, Rosati said. He added that so far there were no formal proposals from Russia and Belarus, although the Russian side has made signs. In Rosati's opinion, the corridor would run across an area of Poland that, for ecological reasons, should be protected from heavy traffic. "We are not planning any highways there, least of all ones that would operate under special laws," Rosati said. "There are simpler ways to connect Kaliningrad with Russia and Belarus via Lithuanian territory," he added.

Asked about Karol Modzelewski's and Ewa Spychalska's candidacies to be Polish ambassadors to Russia and Belarus, which the ZYCIE WARSZAWY reported, Rosati said: "There are no such candidacies for ambassadors: I say this officially. Because of earlier experiences, I can assure you I will be talking publicly about them only when they are boarding the plane," he said.

Rosati also said that [the current Polish] Ambassador [to Russia] Stanislaw Ciosek will be returning to Poland in the summer.

Poland: Cimoszewicz on NATO, Relations With Neighbors

AU2802163896 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Feb 96 p 9

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz by Lubos Palata in Warsaw; date not given: "Polish Prime Minister Cimoszewicz Would Like To Overcome the Crisis by Seeking Compromises With the Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw—New Polish Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz has described the Czech Republic as a priority partner among neighboring states. He has also declared that his country has no open issues with Germany concerning the past. According to him, the property claims of the Germans expelled from Poland after World War II are groundless.

[Palata] You are to meet Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus on 3 March. Does this mean that, of the Central European states, the Czech Republic is a priority partner for Poland?

[Cimoszewicz] We have a major interest in the best possible relations with the countries in our region; relations with the Czech Republic play a very important role in this. I would like to use the meeting with Vaclav Klaus, first and foremost, to improve my knowledge of your successes in the economic sphere and, chiefly, in privatization.

The priorities of Polish foreign policy are very similar to the Czech ones. These are integration into the European Union and membership in the European and euro-atlantic structures. And, not only here do opportunities for cooperation between our states present themselves. It is no coincidence that the Czech prime minister will be my first partner from the countries neighboring Poland.

[Palata] What is more important for Poland today, the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) or the Visegrad Four?

[Cimoszewicz] I do not think it would be appropriate to compare these two things because they have different roles. CEFTA is a very good concrete form for creating better conditions for trade. Our economies are in a phase of dynamic development, and its continuation will depend mainly on the growth of exports. The Visegrad Four complements CEFTA very well as a platform for political cooperation in the region.

[Palata] Prague and Bonn are currently conducting difficult talks on closing the open issues of the past. Has Poland brought these issues to a definitive conclusion with Germany, including Bonn officially giving up the property claims of the Germans expelled from Poland after World War II?

[Cimoszewicz] Fortunately, we have put those issues behind us. They were resolved years ago, by an interstate agreement in the 1970's and 1989, when Germany confirmed the agreement.

As far as I am concerned, there are no issues concerning the past in Polish-German relations of an open nature. Relations with Germany, first and foremost in the economic sphere, are developing extremely successfully. Still, it would be substantive to make some symbolic gestures on the political level—for example, improving cooperation between our armies or establishing a joint military college.

[Palata] Has Bonn given up the property claims of the Germans expelled from Poland?

[Cimoszewicz] No official claims or queries were raised against Poland in this regard, and I do not think they will be because we could not take them into consideration.

[Palata] German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel recently cast doubt on the validity of the Potsdam Agreements.

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This very much alarmed Czech politicians. What do you think?

[Cimoszewicz] I cannot give you an answer because, at the moment, I do not know what the issue is. Can we skip this question?

[Palata] In entering NATO, are you relying more on Germany or on the United States?

[Cimoszewicz] The U.S. support manifested in Warsaw recently by Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke is unequivocal, as is that of Germany. We expect Bonn and Washington to carry out these promises—first and foremost, setting the timetable for the alliance's enlargement before the end of the year.

[Palata] Is Poland's entry into NATO possible during the 18 months of your government's term in office?

[Cimoszewicz] It is hard to say, but I think Poland will become a member of the alliance during the course of the next few years.

[Palata] Has the scandal surrounding your predecessor Oleksy, who is suspected of collaboration with the KGB, and, mainly, that he has stayed in high-level politics, not reduced Poland's chances of admission into NATO?

[Cimoszewicz] I would not use the term Oleksy "scandal" because this suggests that the accusations against the former prime minister are well-founded. It is impossible to say this at the moment. My view is that, as long as the investigation proceeds in accordance with the law and is under democratic supervision, this issue should not damage our relations with the West. Of course, if it were proved that Oleksy is guilty, it could harm these relations.

[Palata] Foreign Minister Rosati has declared, however, that Poland's chances of admission to NATO are being diminished by Oleksy's remaining in the post of chairman of the ruling social democrats.

[Cimoszewicz] I do not want to get into polemics with Minister Rosati. He has a right to his opinion. I think, however, that it is premature. It will be possible to form such opinions only after the Prosecutor's Office announces its conclusions or the court delivers its verdict.

[Palata] Do you not consider the entire scandal to be, primarily, a conspiracy involving former President Walesa and the Polish secret service?

[Cimoszewicz] I do not know; I do not have the brief to say whether the suspicions raised are well founded and true—or not. If it were proved that they are not true, it would be possible to ask: How could this happen? The parliamentary commission looking into this matter is, however, of the opinion that this case is not a political provocation.

[Palata] Russia is very firmly opposed to NATO enlargement. Will Poland take Moscow's stance into consideration?

[Cimoszewicz] Russia formulated its stance on NATO enlargement with regard to its security interests. We are proceeding from the same right to sovereignly formulate our own security interests. We are striving for membership in the alliance and will not alter this.

[Palata] Poland originally wanted to join the European Union and only then adapt to its conditions. Finance Minister Kolodko recently put forward Plan 2000, according to which Warsaw should fulfill the Maastricht criteria before the end of the century. Does this mean a change in the strategy to date?

[Cimoszewicz] Poland already complies with the majority of the criteria for membership in the Union; the same applies to the Maastricht agreements. From this point of view, Deputy Prime Minister Kolodka's proposals are not new and mean a continuation of the economic policy implemented so far, economic policy based on maintaining a high rate of growth, reducing inflation, high investments, and increasing exports.

[Palata] Is the nonproductive and fragmented Polish agriculture not an obstacle to Poland's entry into the European Union?

[Cimoszewicz] It is one of the most difficult economic—and also social—problems in Poland. The problem of Polish agriculture's low productivity and fragmentation and its poor ability to compete compared with Western Europe is an issue we have to resolve. This cannot be done in five years; this is an issue that we will be dealing with for 20 years. This was also the case in many Western countries.

[Palata] More than 4,000 enterprises still remain in state hands. How many of them does your government intend to privatize and in what way?

[Cimoszewicz] We are convinced of the need for the further rapid privatization of the economy, and we will continue in this. The speed and success rate of denationalization are better than under previous governments. The Ministry for State Property, which we are now establishing, will administer just a small group of 200 state enterprises in the future.

[Palata] A screening law is being prepared in the Sejm. Does such a law make sense after six years, and is this not just a nervous reaction to the Oleksy scandal?

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[Cimoszewicz] The issue of screening keeps recurring, so it is necessary to deal with it. However, very precise procedures and criteria have to be guaranteed and independent apolitical bodies appointed to deal with the screenings.

[Palata] Would President Kwasniewski have submitted a draft screening law even if there had not been the Oleksy scandal?

[Cimoszewicz] It is possible that the Oleksy case has caused these propositions to be made now. But, this is already the third attempt to adopt such a law in the Sejm. Incidentally, the left submitted its draft 18 months ago.

[Palata] How do you intend to overcome the current division in Polish society? Why have you not offered the opposition a place in your Cabinet?

[Cimoszewicz] I could not offer the opposition a place because this is a government of this coalition. The opposition's involvement in it was theoretically possible, but it would have had to assess its position realistically. My government is a coalition cabinet, but its members are not essentially political officials from the ruling parties.

Several ministers were chosen not by the parties but by me. This also applies to the justice minister's post—he is also the prosecutor general—whose appointment corresponds to my view that he must be apolitical.

[Palata] But how do you intend to overcome the division of Polish society?

[Cimoszewicz] Something very bad has happened in our society in recent months. All dialogue between the government and the opposition has ceased. This is, however, the state of the political scene, not of society. The majority of Poles favor dialogue and seeking compromises.

I referred to this in my address to the Sejm, and I appealed for us to begin talking with one another in the interest of our country. Before the government's program was presented, I introduced something new into our political practice when I discussed the part concerning foreign and security policy with opposition representatives.

I hope I will soon be able to resume an earnest dialogue with the opposition on other issues—for example, on administrative reform.

I will personally approach these talks with the desire to find common points of view, and I will not use them as an element of political strategy or propaganda.

[Palata] You have said that your objective is to lead the government up to the elections that are due to be held in 18 months. Do you then intend to return to managing your farm in Kalinowka?

[Cimoszewicz] That will depend on the voters. If they make it clear that I was a bad prime minister, I will return to Kalinowka.

Poland: New ZChN Chairman Views European Integration

WS2902085896 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 27 Feb 96 p 2

[Interview with Marian Pilka, newly elected chairman of the Christian National Union, by Igor Zalewski and Piotr Zaremba; place and date not given: "I Want a Coalition That Would Remove the Communists From Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Your predecessor used to refer to the Christian National Union [ZChN] as the biggest right-wing party. However, one could also say that the ZChN is going through a crisis at the moment.

[Pilka] I do not think we are going through a crisis; however, there certainly has been a slump in social support for us. The most important task for us now is to regain that support; this can be achieved by making our platform clearer and by building up our structures.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Why has there been such a big a slump in support for the ZChN?

[Pilka] This is primarily a consequence of the election campaign, during which some of us endorsed Lech Walesa, whereas others backed Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz. Public opinion does not like disputes in political parties.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] When you stopped backing Gronkiewicz-Waltz and threw your support behind Walesa, GAZETA WYBORCZA wrote the following: "Loyal as the ZChN." Your party has so far been known as a group that sticks to its ideology more than any other political group. However, has it not become a symbol of a party that easily changes its alliances?

[Pilka] I understand the motives that were behind the party's decision to support another presidential candidate. After all, support for Ms. Gronkiewicz-Waltz had slumped quite considerably. However, I personally believe that the ZChN should not change its decisions.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] You want to make the ZChN's platform clearer. Do you really want to make it clearer than it is now?

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[Pilka] We must speak more about fundamental Polish problems, about our national interests, about national security, economic policies...

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What exactly do you want to tell people?

[Pilka] We want to say that, in the current situation, when the process of our integration with NATO is in crisis and when integration with the EU is now a matter of 10 years, not three or four, our place in Europe will be determined by our national potential and by our strength. This does not mean that we should stop making efforts to create a friendly international order. However, our country should primarily seek to build its own economic and demographic power. We should seek to overcome the crisis of patriotism.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Still, should we join NATO and the EU?

[Pilka] Today, the United States and some West European countries are increasingly less willing to see Poland admitted to their security structures. Russia has ceased to be perceived as a factor posing a threat to European and global peace. The United States more and more often tends to treat Russia as an element of the balance of power—especially in Asia, where Russia might constitute a counterbalance to the emerging Chinese superpower and the influence of Islam. For these reasons, the United States is skeptical about Poland's admission to NATO.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What consequences does this entail for Poland?

[Pilka] We should not stop making efforts to join NATO, but we must be aware that, after the last presidential elections in Poland, the admission of our country into the alliance ceased to be realistic. As long as the current parliamentary-presidential configuration continues, we will have no chance to join NATO.

Let me also tell you that, until recently, the West felt morally obliged to guarantee us security in return for our contribution to the collapse of communism. As a consequence of the results of the last elections, however, the West now feels partially exempted from this obligation.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] However, this diagnosis may turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

[Pilka] As long as there is no other security system and as long as we are a weak country, we should try to join the Western structures. However, the unified Europe should be a Europe of fatherlands, not a Europe of Brussels bureaucracy.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] You were always seen as an advocate of developing closer relations with Russia.

[Pilka] We live in Central Europe and we must have not only a Western policy, but also an Eastern one. I am an advocate of establishing a free trade zone with our eastern neighbors. I am not thinking of reconstructing the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; I am thinking of creating the appropriate conditions for Poland's economic expansion. However, to develop partnership-based relations with Russia, we must not become totally dependent on Russian natural gas, which the current coalition is doing at the moment. Partnership and respect for Polish national interests are guaranteed only by those groups and politicians who are completely independent of Russia.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Will developing closer economic relations with Russia not result in political dependence?

[Pilka] Economic cooperation with Russia will first of all result in an increase in our national income. Now, the higher this income is, the more other countries in the world will reckon with us.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] There was a time when the ZChN demanded that visas should be required of visitors from behind the Eastern border.

[Pilka] At that time the Russians were taking foreign exchange from Poland. Now they are taking Polish goods abroad. The demand we submitted in 1993 has ceased to be valid.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Where is the ZChN going to look for political allies?

[Pilka] First of all, an election coalition should be formed with Solidarity. In such a bloc, there should be enough room for all of the parties that are right of center.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What about the party of Jan Olszewski, which is rather strong?

[Pilka] The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland and the ZChN have two things in common: anticommunism and the desire to remove agents from public life.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What role would Lech Walesa play?

[Pilka] An election coalition should be formed by political parties. Walesa might be of help in the formation of such a coalition. He might be an intermediary, a patron.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Would he be an intermediary between you and Olszewski?

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[Pilka] This does not seem to be a possibility. However, perhaps he would act as an intermediary between us and the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms. Cooperation with the former president does not need to be given up.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What about the Freedom Union [UW]?

[Pilka] I am a supporter of a coalition that would remove the communists from power. However, it was UW politicians who made it possible for the postcommunist party to survive. In addition, now UW is cooperating with the communists in many local and municipal governments.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Similar allegations, at least those regarding the past, can be leveled at Walesa as well.

[Pilka] Still, it is the current, not historical, accusations that are decisive. For example, the rumors that UW and the Democratic Left Alliance may try to jointly recall Wieslaw Walendziak from the post of public television director are quite disturbing.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What should determine the division of places on joint electoral tickets of the right wing? Should it be based on the results of the 1993 elections or on the results of opinion polls?

[Pilka] It is too early to talk about this.

Poland: PM Favors Secret Service Supervised by Opposition

AU2702123296 Bratislava SME in Slovak 21 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by "jo": "Polish Prime Minister: Opposition Should Take Part in Supervising Secret Services"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw—It is in the interest of the government coalition that the opposition, too, participate in supervising the secret services, Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz said in reply to a question from SME on how he intends to deal with current problems concerning the supervision of secret services. The Polish prime minister went on to say that he does not consider it right for secret and intelligence services to be only under the supervision of the coalition, also because they might become an instrument of a political game. We are considering parity representation in the parliamentary commission for supervising these components, Cimoszewicz said. The Polish prime minister discussed the current problems of his country at a 60-minute meeting organized yesterday by GAZETA WYBORCZA Chief Editor Adam Michnik and attended by representatives of newspapers that publish a regular supplement on Central Europe—GAZETA WYBORCZA, MAGYAR HIRLAP, LIDOVE NOVINY, and SME. The meeting was also attended by Rudolf Chmel, chief editor of STREDOEUROPSKE NOVINY [Central European News] as a whole.

Poland: Biography of Acting Head of Secret Police

LD2802194896 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1845 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 28 Feb—Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski, MSW [Internal Affairs Ministry] counterintelligence officer since 1968, has been appointed acting head of the State Protection Office [UOP] by Internal Affairs Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, the MSW Press Department reported today.

A. Kapkowski was born on 7 February 1944. He graduated in psychology from Warsaw University. He has been an MSW counterintelligence officer since 1968. He has worked in various posts at home and abroad. From 1992 until December 1995 he was deputy director and, since January 1996, director of the UOP Counterintelligence Directorate.

Poland: President, Army Discuss Constitutional Changes

WS2802154796 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Z.L.: "How To Command Constitutionally; Majors Are Leaving the Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Yesterday a meeting was held between President Aleksander Kwasniewski, National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski, Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Zalucki, National Security Office head Jerzy Milewski, and General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff. They discussed future changes in the principles of managing defense issues at the highest level and possible reflections of those changes in the new constitution. Discussed were also the state of legislative work, particularly the draft law on military duty and defense obligations.*

The small constitution does not specify very precisely the tasks of the highest state organs in the sphere of national defense; in the past, some of its provisions gave rise to disputes in interpretation. One of the issues the participants in the meeting debated for a long time yesterday was how to precisely specify the powers of the chief of the General Staff.

Currently, the president, after consulting with the national defense minister, appoints and dismisses the highest-ranking military officer, the chief of the General Staff; also, on the motion of the minister, he appoints

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and recalls the deputies of the General Staff chief, commanders of various branches of the Armed Forces, and commanders of military districts. The issue of the commander in chief remains unresolved; in line with the small constitution, he is to be appointed and recalled by the president "for the duration of a war." Servicemen argue that the function of the commander in chief or the general inspector of the Armed Forces, as was envisioned in some conceptions, should be specified beforehand so that it will not be necessary to look for an appropriate candidate when the critical "W" hour comes.

On Tuesday, the national defense minister spent nearly two hours informing Aleksander Kwasniewski about the details of plans involving legislative changes in the ministry. In March, a special team headed by First Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka is to submit a proposal of solutions aimed at integrating the ministry with the General Staff, as well as eliminating redundant structures in the civilian and military branches that have existed so far. Preparations are under way for great restructuring processes in the Air Forces: In place of the current Air Forces and the National Air Defense Forces, two corps of National Air Defense will be established—a northern corps in Bydgoszcz and a southern corps in Wroclaw. Also, one striking air corps will be set up. Over the next nine years, the number of officers and soldiers will be reduced in this branch of the Armed Forces from 53,500 to 41,500. Out of the current 180 units, only 120 will be left. Instead of 352 planes, we will have 230; some of them will be more up-to-date—if there is enough money for this indispensable yet most expensive modernization process in the entire Armed Forces.

During his first meeting with the highest-ranking commanders in Warsaw, President Aleksander Kwasniewski stressed his determination to support modernization efforts in the Armed Forces and plans for earmarking more funds for the military. "However, today we can see increasingly disturbing consequences of statements made by some politicians on the future of financing the Armed Forces and on the retirement pension plan for the cadres," said Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda, spokesman of the General Staff. Nearly 6,000 applications requesting discharge from professional military service—the number is twice as high as was predicted—means that many specialists are leaving the Armed Forces. The largest group among the outgoing servicemen is made up of officers of the best age. Most often they are majors who have been with the Armed Forces for 15 years and have a lot of experience.

Poland: Head of Sejm Constitutional Commission Profiled

WS2802134296 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 26 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "LUZ": "Internationalist Mazurkiewicz Writes the Constitution"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Marek Mazurkiewicz, newly appointed chairman of the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly (elected by the postcommunist and peasant majority), is a lawyer and professor-lecturer at Wroclaw University.

"He was always very devoted to his party," says Professor Teresa Janasz who, together with a group of other professors, supported the student protests in 1968.

After March 1968, the executive of the university committee of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] approved the nomination of Mazurkiewicz (who was only an assistant professor without habilitation at the time) to docent. He thus found himself in the group of the so-called March docents who were awarded by the PZPR for the proper ideological attitude and defense of party policies during the student protests staged in the name of law and freedom of speech. He defended his thesis 18 years later.

March 1968 did not drain Mazurkiewicz's energy very much. In October of the same year, he suggested that the Senate of Wroclaw University send a letter to our troops who invaded Czechoslovakia in the Warsaw Pact operation. The Senate agreed and sent the soldiers a letter expressing "appreciation for a virtuous attitude in fulfilling a difficult internationalist mission." [passage omitted]

Mazurkiewicz is not highly respected even by those with similar political sympathies. As we found out, several politicians backed out of the previous parliamentary elections because they did not want their names to appear with his on the Democratic Left Alliance ticket. [passage omitted]

Poland: New Chief of Staff of Warsaw Military District

WS2802134596 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 28 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by "(jk)": "New Chief of the Warsaw Military District Staff"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Brigadier General Czeslaw Pietas, newly appointed chief of staff of the Warsaw Military District [WOW], has been introduced in front of the chief of strategic planning of the General Staff*

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of the Polish Armed Forces Division, General Marian Robelek, and WOW cadres at the Citadel in Warsaw.

Gen. Czeslaw Piatas was born on 20 March 1946. In 1968 he graduated from the Armored Troop Officers School. He began his military service at the 11th Armored Division in Zagan, where he held a number of positions, from platoon leader to chief of regimental staff. He was then commander of the 10th Regiment and chief of the 10th Mechanized Division. In the years 1991-93, he commanded the 4th Mechanized Division in Krosno Odrzanskie. Since 1993 he has served as deputy chief of the Silesian Military District Staff in charge of operations.

Married, with two children; wife Danuta; son Slawomir, a third-year student at the Medical Academy; daughter Martyna, a high school student. Gen. Pietas's hobbies are fishing, tennis, and shooting.

Poland: Union of Labor Council Passes Resolution

WS2702144396 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 26 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "DM": "The Union of Labor Advocates Social Justice; Neither With the Right nor With the SLD"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Union of Labor [UP] will continue to build up its own power alone and will join neither the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] nor the post-Solidarity camp. Despite criticism from the party leaders, the UP National Council did not dismiss any member of its presidium.

"Support for the party has waned, and its structures are not developing sufficiently enough," begins the resolution passed by the Council. The UP members who debated on Saturday and Sunday concluded that the reason for their declining popularity is not only an increasingly sharp division into a postcommunist and a post-Solidarity faction, but also the fact that the party does not project any definite image.

Backstage at the Sejm it had been said that a group of grass-roots activists would attempt to suspend UP Chairman Ryszard Bugaj from his duties. His adversaries say he is overly critical of the SLD.

"There have been singular voices in support of cooperation with the SLD," Bugaj admitted during a news conference on Sunday. The resolution passed by the Council, however, "firmly rejects the possibility of forming a bloc with the SLD, which is implementing a liberal social policy." The Council also decided that the case of those responsible for martial law should be settled by the State Tribunal, and that the decision of the Constitutional Responsibility Commission not to institute any proceedings against them "violates the principles of a legitimate democratic state."

UP plans to develop an alternative project of "solving socioeconomic problems" in order to attract voters. The party claims that the distribution of the growing national product is unfair, and announcements made by the SLD-Polish Peasant Party government that tax thresholds will be lowered from 21, 33, and 45 percent to 20, 30, and 40 percent will not bring the lowest income groups much relief but will be highly favorable for the highest income groups. UP also claims that the privatized national assets are distributed unfairly and that the National Investment Funds are particularly harmful. "A large share of the national assets has been taken over by privileged social groups," states the UP resolution. UP members believe that SLD circles are informally taking control of an ever larger part of the economy.

Poland: Center Accord Leader on Right-Wing Unification

WS2902120896 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 19 Feb 96 p 4

[Interview with Polish Center Accord Chairman Jaroslaw Kaczynski by Tomasz Szymborski; place and date not given: "Nation Likes the Strong"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Szymborski] Why is the unification of the Polish right wing taking so long? Do you believe that unification and the establishment of a confederation for right-wing parties are feasible?

[Kaczynski] One should accept a certain minimum program for such a confederation, and it is feasible because various parties' stands on fundamental issues have become significantly closer, not immediately of course, but during the past two years. For instance, the parties whose stand on the issue of market economy was at best ambivalent today univocally opt for it. Here I mean the Christian National Union. Not long ago, other parties kept saying that any vetting and decommunization slogans were madness; today they say something different.

[Szymborski] What about former president Walesa?

[Kaczynski] The issue of former President Lech Walesa is not so important now as it used to be when Walesa was doing many things one could hardly come to terms with. Today he continues to be an important aspect of the Polish political stage, but not so important as he used to be. Unification, however, is being hampered not so much by him as by a reluctance to accept certain, obvious to everybody else, rules of the game. Some politicians hope they will be winners in this

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crisis, that perhaps they will be able to eliminate the others. Our project is based on the fact that no one is eliminated; we frankly acknowledge that some parties have strengthened their stands. Jan Olszewski and his party's and Solidarity's positions have surely become stronger. Our project is not aimed at deceiving anyone.

[Szymborski] The leaders of right-wing parties have strong personalities. Do you believe they can cooperate with one another?

[Kaczynski] I think that in some cases we deal with a problem of pathologically excessive ambition. Responsible politicians who think about the interests of the Polish raison d'etat can surely unite. Today, anybody who does not want to unite on reasonable principles shows who in fact he is—a wrong-doer.

[Szymborski] What actions would you like to take to make those who hesitate between the left wing and the right wing interested? Public opinion polls indicate that every third Pole opts for the communists.

[Kaczynski] Sociological methods that prove correct in the West may not be true here; so I would not take the polls uncritically. One should be aware that part of society does support the communists. One should also be aware that the communists are strong and that the nation likes to support the strong.

[Szymborski] President Kwasniewski has proposed the vetting bill. Some politicians from your camp ask if revealing the [former internal affairs minister] Macierewicz list was a mistake.

[Kaczynski] The decision about the Macierewicz list was thoroughly selfish. Nevertheless, I believe it was necessary. What happened after 4 June [1993], when Minister Macierewicz revealed some data, hampered vetting. However, it was caused not by Macierewicz but, rather, by a gigantic campaign launched against him. GAZETA WYBORCZA, for instance, heavily criticized vetting at the time, and now it says that [improperly prepared] "vetting harmed vetting."

[Szymborski] The communists will say the sentence passed on Jerzy Urban [former spokesman for the martial law regime] has been an attempt against freedom of speech. Is is not a paradox?

[Kaczynski] This is simply how communists take advantage of power. They know how to rule. They do not have the qualms we used to have.

Poland: NIE Chief Editor Urban Interviewed

WS2902112296 Wroclaw SLOWO POLSKIE in Polish 16 Feb 96 pp 2, 6

[Interview with NIE Chief Editor Jerzy Urban by Wojciech Chadzynski; place and date not given: "Revealing Secrets"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Chadzynski] You were sentenced for having disclosed classified materials. What next?

[Urban] Lawyers are egging me on to lodge an appeal. Because my tendency to make corrupt schemes look more spectacular is dangerous, then, with the next stories, I might feel uncomfortable at the prospect of the sentence being executed. This would hamper my editing the paper. Moreover, if I am to calculate in order to capitalize on it, the subsequent trials will again focus attention on this issue, surely to a greater extent than if I arranged the kind of show as did our associate Ryszard Zajac, which landed him in jail.

[Chadzynski] Should a journalist disclose secret materials?

[Urban] I think he should. On condition, however, that the good result, on behalf of which he is doing this, is in appropriate proportion to the conceivable damages done by revealing this secret. This means that if the journalist, wishing to show only that he knows everything, made public, for instance, mobilization plans, it would be very unfair to the state. If, however, some instructions coming from the Office of State Protection [UOP] on illegal surveillance of political parties find their way into the hands of a journalist, it is his duty to reveal such materials, even if they constitute a UOP secret. If the journalist is told at the Ministry of National Defense [MON] or the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] that the information he is being provided with must not be published because it is a secret and he does publish it, then I think he should be uncompromisingly punished. If, however, someone, on his own, reveals a secret to the journalist, the journalist should not bear any responsibility.

Today the absurd thing is that the law stipulates that anyone who reveals a secret is a criminal. Does that include a third party who repeats it and comments on it after it has been published in other papers? I think there should be an appropriate legal rule on this matter. The Helsinki Committee has already taken a position on this issue, as well as the entire journalistic community. The Senate also rejected the draft bill on the common duty of protecting state secrets. The precaution is unfeasible due to the fact that not everything labeled as "secret" can be regarded as such. For instance, ambassadors' coded

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dispatches can concern information on what the weather is like in Melbourne because this is where a member of our government is going and he wants to know how to dress. Nonetheless, the dispatch is secret because it is not the weather that is secret but the wording that can be used to break a code. Thus, can one infer that saying "Tomorrow it is going to rain in Melbourne" is a secret of the Polish state? Nonsense! The secret is only the document, which cannot be shown to anybody.

When I was government spokesman, at my request, the MSW used to provide me with information that I spoke about at press conferences. Those documents were labeled secret because it is a conditioned reflex with them. One should not treat every classified document as a state secret. On the other hand, one cannot believe that every journalist can decide, on his own, what is and what is not a secret. If, for instance, the technical blueprint of the Iryda aircraft is published, I have no idea what is and what is not classified there. Therefore, this problem can be reasonably settled in such a way that those who are the guardians of secrets should guard them, but without obsessiveness. On the other hand, people who have access to those secrets should have the freedom to make them public but should also be aware that they will be accountable to public opinion if they spill the beans.

[Chadzynski] According to the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS], over half of Poland's adult residents believe that foreign intelligence services have an influence on the course of events in Poland. Many people are also of the opinion that a significant number of Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] members cooperate with Russian intelligence.

[Urban] It is a symptom of the spy phobia artificially engineered by Walesa's orders to, as he put it, make the opponent groggy. I do not believe that Poland is being penetrated by foreign intelligence services. What do they find so attractive in our country? I doubt that it is technological and industrial intelligence. Neither, I guess, is military intelligence of interest to them. And political intelligence—totally useless. Anything that is happening in politics is brought out into the open. Therefore, I think this spy phobia is the work of a clique of the secret police, who, unlike what the Sejm Extraordinary Committee has ruled, is intruding into politics and is living off that. Anyway, Czempinski [head of UOP] himself told me that 40 percent of his workday is devoted to politics and the remaining 60 percent to work. At the same time, he assured me that, as the head of UOP, he was apolitical.

Left-wing politicians have a complex about their roots. One of its symptoms is demonstrating their eagerness to join NATO, which, in my opinion, serves no purpose when expressed in public. It is only irritating the Russians and moving us away from NATO. Thus, from a psychological point of view, it is less probable that a left-wing politician collaborated with Russian intelligence than Geremek, for instance, did.

[Chadzynski] What do you think of the Oleksy case?

[Urban] I have no idea what is in the files. Since nothing concrete has been said on their contents, it means they contain nothing. Oleksy's intelligence-like collaboration with Russian diplomats is improbable. The meetings with them were held in the open, in the company of many people and on the premises of the housing estate where we all used to live together. Anybody who knows a little about the work of intelligence services is aware of the fact that, if one of the three most important people in Poland had indeed been a KGB mole, he would have been so cleverly planted that any drunken Alganov loitering from home to home would not have had to extract information out of him. Collaboration with intelligence services does not mean talking with people who may be linked to them. For years I used to meet hundreds of foreign journalists and diplomats. From a statistical point of view, at least 10 percent of them were representatives of intelligence. It did not bother me at all. It all depends on what people talk about during such meetings.

What are the bad consequences of the Oleksy case, apart from the all-pervading atmosphere of spy phobia, which, I believe, is groundless? Is the game being played to save those dishonest, suspicious services and to make them more important so that they can serve to build political schemes and do in politicians? It may create something that has not been present in Poland for years—namely, a fear of contact with foreigners.

[Chadzynski] In your magazine, you devote a lot of space to the clergy. Is NIE going to reveal names of priests who collaborated with the secret police [SB]?

[Urban] My weekly will not deal with vetting, and what we did with Najder, codenamed "Lighter," was an exception because of the fact that he belonged to the team of vetters. We intended to show that he did not have a moral right to engage in the Macierewicz file scandal. When it comes to priests, there is no such information. If I had it, I would be happy to use it. However, not in order to publish a list of priests-agents but rather to say with satisfaction, in a situation when some bishop says that one must not give absolution to the people who voted for the left-wing: He is an old SB agent, and now he is making a fool of himself. I do not have such a possibility.

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Slovenia: Law on SFRY Debt Repayment Passed

AU2802215396 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Following a stormy debate that took place behind closed doors in which the opposition raised all sorts of unpleasant questions, the State Chamber deputies, with 44 votes in favor and four against, passed a law on the assumption of the debt from the 1988 New Financial Agreement and a law on the issue of the Slovene state bonds to repay this debt. This involves an agreement with the commercial banks to which we will repay 18 percent of the former joint Yugoslav debt. In the best case, we will repay $822 million worth of capital and interest.

After the law was passed, National Bank Governor Dr. France Arhar said the following in an interview for Suzana Kos:

[Begin recording] [Kos] What was definitely one of the most important projects that you have worked on in the past few years that you have been the National Bank governor is over. First of all, are you satisfied?

[Arhar] Definitely. I mean, we made another step forward, but the story is not over yet, of course. However, the decision of the Slovene parliament that confirms the formal framework creates new possibilities for the continuation of this project.

[Kos] You said that the story is not over yet. By saying this, you are probably referring primarily to everything that will probably happen in connection with the compensation suits and to everything that Slovenia will have to do in the time before the issue of the bonds. First of all, when will the process of the bond issue be completed?

[Arhar] According to this schedule, if everything runs smoothly, the matter will be completed in a few months, therefore some time in summer. The agreement is a living organism. Within these contractual relations, we can expect attempts by some to debase this results, as well as attempts on our part to achieve progress with other Yugoslav debtors and find solutions with these debtors and in some cases also creditors on the relations between the Republic of Slovenia and them. Therefore, this will transform the succession issue into reality. [end recording]

Slovenia: Social Democrats Criticize SFRY Debt Accord

AU2802171096 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In the name of the Social Democratic Party, Dr. Joze Zagozen presented the party's standpoints on the separate agreement on the repayment of debts of the former Yugoslavia. The party claims the law on repayment of debts that is currently in the parliamentary procedure is inconcise and misleading. The unallocated debts pose the biggest problem because instead of the Paris key, which envisages a repayment of 16.4 percent, we will have to repay 35 percent of the joint debt.

The party president [Janez Jansa] at a news conference commented on some of the current political evnts. First he mentioned the conclusion of the EU foreign ministers' conference in Brussels which foresees a sort of reunification and reintegration of the territory of the former Yugoslavia. He also commented on the latest moves by the government and the Defense Ministry which, according to Jansa, pushed us further away from NATO and the lifting of the arms embargo.

As regards the appointment of the new ministers, Jansa said that the new ministers have not replaced a single state secretary of the United List yet, which shows that the departure of the United List from the government was nothing but an electoral move.

Slovenia: Clinton Promises Support for EU Integration

AU2702212196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek received a letter from U.S. President Bill Clinton today. The letter says that the U.S. President values Slovenia's cooperation in the passage of the Implementation Force troops over the Slovene territory.

At the same time, Clinton congratulates the Slovene prime minister and all Slovenes on their exemplary policy following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. U.S. President Clinton emphasized that Slovenia has won numerous friends worldwide precisely with its commitment to peace and democracy.

U.S. President also voiced support for the Slovene persistence in the efforts to join Western economic and security integrations. The United States will support Slovenia even more in this pursuit in the hope that the agreement with the European Union will be reached as soon as possible.

Slovenia: Parliamentary Delegates View EU Membership

AU2702175696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A State Chamber delegation started a meeting with the European Parliament delega-

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tion for Slovenia that was closed to correspondents this morning. Our correspondent Edo Zitnik reports from Brussels:

[Begin recording] The introductory speeches by the Slovene members of the delegation very clearly reflected the not entirely harmonized views of the parliamentary parties on the Slovene-Italian dispute and rapprochement with the European Union.

The head of the delegation, Borut Pahor, openly wondered how it was possible that a politically stable and economically successful country like Slovenia could not sign the associate membership agreement. He cited Slovenia's exemplary economical statistical data over the past few years and warned that the Slovene parliament had already initialed the debate on the harmonization of the property legislation.

Mihaela Logar from the People's Party was even more to the point. Slovenia meets all the criteria for associate membership. It is willing to harmonize its legislation, however, not before the agreement is signed. She also fears new Italian blackmail.

Lojze Peterle meaningfully introduced himself as a partner in the government coalition. He said that the government had expressed readiness to embrace the Spanish initiative. He voiced the hope that our association membership agreement will be signed during the Italian presidency, while, in the second half of the year, we will apply for full-fledged membership in the union. On several occasions, Peterle warned of the danger of applying ideological and nationalist criteria in the resolution of the Slovene-Italian dispute. What we need is a Slovene-Italian reconciliation such as Germany and France were capable of. Peterle also reminded that the domestic political situation, particularly because of the timing of the elections on both sides of the border, should not be ignored either.

Liberal Democrat Marjan Setinc exposed the problem of increasingly more Slovenes sporting a negative attitude toward the European Union due to the Italian veto. The extremist opposition parties have, according to him, already started playing up on the anti-European sentiments. Certain historic facts between Italy and Slovenia cannot be changed, according to Setinc. Following the initial debate, the meeting, which is still underway, was closed to the public. [end recording]

Slovenia: Italy Indicts Slovenes, Croats for Genocide

AU2802180196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 27 Feb 96

[Report by Jure Pengov from Rome — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] In two and a half months, investigation judge (Giuseppe Pitito) completed a hefty investigation and indicted 82 persons, of whom approximately 30 are Italian citizens and the rest of them are Slovenes, Croats, or of unknown nationality. On 10 suspects, (Pitito) gathered complete documentation, including their current addresses, while for 72 of them he lists names, surnames, and nicknames that the persons used at the time when they participated in the mass executions of Italians, as the document says.

(Pitito) mostly obtained the names of the suspects from the testimonies of the relatives or eyewitnesses to these actions. Many of them went his office in the Justice Ministry in Rome to testify. He also obtained a couple of testimonies during his visit to Trieste and other towns in Friuli-Venezia. The organizations of esuli [the Italian refugees from Istria] were of substantial assistance here.

It is anticipated that, in a couple of days, he could issue arrest warrants for those suspects who have been fully identified, including international arrest warrants against those who live abroad. In international and Italian jurisdiction, genocide falls into the category of crimes that never become obsolete. If the accused are proven guilty, they face life sentences. That is all that is known about this affair, these are the facts.

We should perhaps add that, during the presentation of the investigation results, the investigation judge, (Pitito), dismissed as unjustified the statement by Slovene Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler that he was doing the Italian right wing an electoral favor by saying that the investigation did not have political but exclusively punitive and legal objectives.

Here are some other specifics. The judge did not invite the Slovene journalists to attend the presentation of the results of the investigation, although he has our addresses because we have already reported on this subject.

Today, the Italian press abounds in articles on this topic. The right-wing press is paying special attention to it. There are also speculations about the names of the suspects, even their addresses have been published, and so forth. It is also characteristic that Judge (Pitito), in two and a half months, completed an investigation that was formally opened in 1994, but was informally opened two years earlier, at which time it did not move

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from a standstill — with an explanation that, 50 years after the events, it would be very difficult to pinpoint personal responsibility for the acts in question.

Slovenia: UK Firm Protests Israeli Defense Sale

AU2902105896 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 26 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by Vladimir Vodusek: "The British Are Also Protesting Against Purchases in Israel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 25 Feb — On the day of the visit by British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, the British military radio equipment manufacturer Racal addressed a lengthy letter to Defense Minister Jelko Kacin, protesting against the procedures relating to the purchase of military radio equipment.

On 19 February, the British company Racal protested to the Defense Ministry over the procedure, course, and decision relating to the purchase of military radio equipment from the Tadiran company in Israel. According to Racal, the impression is that everything had been done on the basis of previously made decisions.

"We were prepared to make a detailed presentation of our offer if necessary, but the ministry has decided to grant the contract to Tadiran. The Slovene Armed Forces will be purchasing equipment of lesser value, which will become outdated quickly and will need to be replaced soon," the Racal director also stated.

Apart from that, our country is losing the opportunity to purchase radio equipment which, according to its producer, is the world leader in advanced technology. Apart from up-to-date equipment, which will not grow obsolete within the next few years, Racal guarantees employment to a few hundred people, the transfer of contemporary technology, as well as domestic servicing and repairs.

Racal also mentions the existing national defense system, as well as the compatibility with Jaguar radio connections already present in Slovenia. Another fact that Racal sees as problematic is that the Defense Ministry has altered its original invitation for tenders.

The first invitation for tenders was issued in 1994, and the offer was rejected that same year. The British manufacturer ascertains that the second invitation for tenders was issued after Tadiran's equipment had already arrived in the country, and was therefore custom-written for the Israeli tenderer.

The additional invitation for tenders made it impossible for the competitors' prices to be made public. Racal's representatives maintain that the final price, as given by Tadiran, is not as favorable for Slovenia as it may seem.

The aforementioned letter was also made known to Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek, who had spoken about the problems of communication equipment purchases with the U.S. Ambassador Jackovich, before the British foreign secretary's visit.

It is known that embassies keep track of invitations for tenders, but they had become aware of the closing of the deal only after the contract was signed, and this makes the endeavors of the U.S. and British political circles understandable.

British Racal's protest followed a reaction by the U.S. corporation Harris, which had sent a letter of similar content to similar addresses. Racal informs Kacin and Drnovsek that the British Government is fully aware of the situation and that it is, along with the Foreign Office, of the same opinion as Racal.

According to media reports in Great Britain, the British foreign secretary's reason to visit Slovenia was the equipment purchase issue. A senior NATO representative had also visited Slovenia the week before. The content of all written records of the visit is similar.

The purchase of British or western communications systems as used within NATO would significantly increase Slovenia's chances in its endeavors concerning EU and NATO membership. The same would apply if we were to buy equipment that is already in use in NATO. The supposed reason for Malcolm Rifkind's visit was primarily to look for orders for the British military industry as well as a revision of the Israeli radio equipment deal, according to reports in two respectable British newspapers.

The first phase of civil and military telecommunication systems modernization is, according to the reports in Britain, worth $90 million, and the deal with Israel is, according to the Defense Ministry, worth $10 million.

At a press conference not long ago, Jelko Kacin said that this is the first of five projects, which means that the contracts for the rest of the equipment, apart from the HF and VHF equipment bought in Israel, will be signed soon. That is where the companies, which were unsuccessful in the first invitation for tenders, are to get their chance.

Apart from an assurance of a revision, Rifkind also received tangible assurances from Prime Minister Drnovsek that the British will receive, if not this deal, other deals from the Funds for the Defense, which are estimated at $750 million.

The tenderers included, alongside Racal, also Harris, GEC Marconi, and Siemens. According to THE GUARDIAN, Rifkind was supposed to convince

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Drnovsek to give these companies another possibility to present their equipment.

The findings of a special commission founded by the prime minister were not publicly presented, but according to representatives of the Defense Ministry there were no irregularities found with the purchases neither from a technical nor financial side.

Slovenia: Speaker Survives No Confidence Vote

AU2802214796 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] With 38 votes against and 19 votes in favor, the State Chamber rejected the initiative for the replacement of State Chamber Speaker Jozef Skoljc. As it is known, a group of 10 deputies from the Slovene People's Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the independent group of deputies on 1 February proposed Skoljc's replacement due to alleged violations of the rules of procedure at the session at which Economics Minister Tajnikar resigned.

The initiators at the session repeated their accusations while the Liberal Democrats, the Democrats, and the deputies of the ethnic minorities supported Skoljc. The Christian Democrats and the United List did not take a stance as groups of deputies. [passage omitted]

Slovenia: Finance Minister Attacked Over NFA Accord

AU2702174996 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 27 Feb 96

[Report by Suzana Kos on State Chamber session in Ljubljana on 27 February — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kos] The law on the regulation of relations with foreign commercial banks is supposed to resolve three issues. First, the assumption of the 18-percent share of the debt of the former Yugoslavia with the foreign commercial banks. According to the law, this debt would be settled with the state bonds by the year 2006. The proposed law also defines the relationship between the Slovene debtors and the state, whereby our share of the debt would, with the capital and the outstanding interest, come to a little more than $820 million.

The representatives of the Social Democrats and the People's Party were critical of the proposed solution of the debtor's issue. Marijan Podobnik [president of the Slovene People's Party], especially, was dissatisfied because he was not convinced that Slovenia, by paying the share of the debt thus assumed, would actually free itself from all other burdens and obligations stemming from it. In general, he was also suspicious because the government refused to incorporate the representatives of the opposition in the group that was negotiating with the creditors.

Among those who purchased debts [on the secondary market] was also Safti, Marijan Podobnik said.

[Podobnik] The father-in-law of the financial minister is a senior official in Safti and a former director of Adit. Safti's company agreed happily to a separate agreement. A manager of the former NFS [as heard] agent, Manufacturer Hannover, is the spouse of a female official in the present agent Chemical. The man also controls one of the banks in Ljubljana.

[Kos] Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari was the first to answer the criticism leveled in the debate. He dispelled all doubts regarding the procedure of the negotiations, and again emphasized that Slovenia would benefit from the agreement with the creditors and that it would be absolved of all obligations from the old agreement.

In reply to personal accusations, he said that Marijan Podobnik is trying to score political points through personal discredit.

[Gaspari] I, personally, have a completely clear conscience. There is no nepotism involved, however, if you wish me to comment on the manner of work in this field, I can tell you that here, with me, I have an agreement by one of your colleagues for 130,000 German Marks [DM], which was an incentive to somebody to sign a cooperation agreement on the negotiations within the NFA [New Financial Agreement] with him.

[Kos] And the name in the agreement for DM130,000? According to the minister, the man is Peter Lampic, member of the Civilian Initiative.

Slovenia: Krsko Earthquake Security Fears Downplayed

AU2702180396 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] It is true that the Krsko nuclear power plant is situated on the part of Slovenia that is under the earthquake risk. For that reason, all the installations of the power plant, as well as the reactor chamber, were designed with this fact in mind, it is written, among other things, in a statement for the public published by the Nuclear Safety Administration of Slovenia today.

We cherish the efforts of the international ecological movements to preserve the human environment, as this is also the general orientation of the above administration. However, we are by no means concerned by the

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conclusions of the Austrian Greenpeace, as their claims have no realistic basis.

The Krsko nuclear power plant is a plant of the Western type, designed in such a fashion that, in the event of a possible danger, all radioactive emissions would remain within the plant. The plant has several safety barriers, including a retaining chamber [zadrzevalni hram] — a steel pressure barrel enveloped in thick concrete. The plant in Chernobyl did not have such a barrier. Hence, the conclusion is that, in the event of a possible accident, a catastrophe of the dimensions such as that in Chernobyl would not be possible in Slovenia, reads the statement by the Nuclear Safety Administration of Slovenia.

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Federal

FRY: Bulatovic Discusses Possibility of PFP Membership

AU2802213296 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 28 Feb 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Decisions Should Not Be Made in Haste"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] has, so far, not received any official demand on the basis of which it would have to decide whether to join the Partnership for Peace [PFP] program or NATO, Federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic said in an interview to Radio Yugoslavia yesterday, as reported by TANJUG.

"In order to make a decision on this, we must seriously examine the advantages and disadvantages," Bulatovic stressed, TANJUG reports. Regional and global integration processes that have recently started in Europe and the world, are not only military processes. They are also economic, and political integration processes, the federal minister stressed.

Yugoslavia is actively cooperating, without any prejudice, with NATO member countries and those who have joined the Partnership for Peace program.

"That is why I do not see any reason for Yugoslavia to make a hasty decision as our state's priorities are its reintegration into international political, economic, and financial organizations," Minister Bulatovic said.

FRY: Monitors End Mission on FRY-Bosnia Border

AU2802194196 Paris AFP in English 1908 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 28 (AFP) — International monitors Wednesday ended their operation monitoring the level of trade crossing the border between rump Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a spokesman for the monitoring mission said Wednesday.

Abel Zele said the monitoring mission, set up in September 1994 when rump Yugoslavia, comprised of Serbia and Montenegro, had agreed to impose sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, had "stopped all its operations" after the UN lifted sanctions against the Serbs Tuesday.

Responsibility for monitoring the trade between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb capital of Pale would now revert to the rump Yugoslavia, Zele said.

FRY: Central Bank Governor Rules Out Floating Rate

LD2802100396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0948 GMT 28 Feb 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 28 (TANJUG) — Yugoslav National Bank Governor Dragoslav Avramovic said Tuesday the rate of exchange of the Yugoslav national currency had been stabilized in the past week and that he did not expect prices to go up much.

This is why there is no reason to introduce a floating rate of exchange for the dinar, because it would confirm that inflation was indeed expected, Avramovic said in talks with reporters in Belgrade.

The most serious reason why the German Mark is worth 3.5-3.7 dinars on the black market (the official rate of exchange is 3.3 dinars for one mark) is the existence of large-scale smuggling, he said.

Importers cannot get hard currency legally, as they do not have contracts with foreign partners, so that they are forced to go to the black market, bidding against each other and thus raising the rate, the governor explained.

Asked if his announced trip to London on March 3 indicated that old credits might be reopened, Avramovic did not answer directly but reiterated that he had asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to normalize relations with Yugoslavia.

Avramovic said he believed these talks would take some time since they were linked with the defining of Yugoslavia's general position in international organizations. A favorable outcome, however, does not mean that funds will be immediately available, he warned. He said he hoped the talks would yield positive results.

It would be good if we could meanwhile acquire certain funds from abroad to bridge the current monetary crunch since we must not spend reserves, Avramovic said.

Asked if he had contacted the so-called London Club of creditors yet, Avramovic said he had not but that he would be available if they wished to meet.

FRY: Taxes for Foreign Tourists To Be Reduced

LD2902130596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1212 GMT 29 Feb 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 28 (TANJUG) — Yugoslavia's return to the international tourist market and the settlement of financial problems in tourism

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with the help of state institutions are the priority tasks of that economic branch, it was heard at a meeting of the Committee for Tourism and Catering of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce in Belgrade on Wednesday [28 February].

Tourist officials said that new visa requirements should be determined and taxes for foreign tourists reduced with regard to the fact that those extra expenses considerably reduced the number of tourists visiting Yugoslavia.

Official of the Serbian Ministry of Tourism Dragan Barjaktarovic said that suspension of visa requirements should be discussed in bilateral relations with individual countries.

He said a proposal had been submitted to federal organs to abolish taxes for foreigners that had been introduced under the regime of international sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Federal organs were also asked to reopen duty free shops at border crossings and in four-star and five-star hotels, where Yugoslav and foreign goods could be sold for hard currency.

FRY: Serbian Opposition Party Not To Rally 9 Mar

LD2802184696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1321 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 28 Feb (TANJUG) — Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, chairman of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), today said the party had nothing against marking 9 March [anniversary of Vuk Draskovic-led opposition uprising in Belgrade], but equally "had nothing to contribute to it" as the evacuation of Serbs from Sarajevo was a much more important political event at the moment.

At a news conference, Kostunica called the evacuation from Serb Sarajevo a key issue in a moral and political sense.

The DSS chairman said the policy of the international community was to cover up the importance and proportions of the evacuation, introduce the principle of symmetry, and thus put the victims, the Sarajevo Serbs, on trial.

Kostunica said that for the international community Bosnia-Herzegovina was "a big laboratory in which the idea of brotherhood and unity has to be carried out, but this time in the American way." [passage omitted]

"I have never spoken about participation in a gathering. I have explained my personal view which is in favor of 9 March, but in my opinion this date should, most probably, be marked in some other manner in the current circumstances. Whether we like it or not this date is in the past, but what worries us is how to cope with the present," the DSS chairman said.

FRY: Nearly 200 Political Parties Now Registered

AU2902132996 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Feb 96 p 12

[Commentary by B. Radivojsa: "FRY Has 198 Registered Political Parties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the recent entry of the Democratic Center [Demokratski Centar] party on the register, we have come a step closer to having 200 political parties in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. To be more precise, Dragoljub Micunovic's newly founded party was registered under number 198. That is how many parties have been registered by the three justice ministries, two republican and a federal one.

This does not mean that this is the actual number of parties. Quite a few of the parties on the list have ceased all activity, but as their founders have not applied to have them removed from the list, they keep their entry number, thereby creating the impression that there is a real crowd on our party scene.

In any case, of these 198 parties, 161 are from Serbia and 37 from Montenegro. It is interesting to note that 130 parties are registered in the Justice Ministry of Serbia, 37 in the Justice Ministry of Montenegro, and 61 in the federal ministry.

Some of the parties have been registered at federal level and listed in the republics as well, so there are only 31 parties that are registered just at the federal level. Parties that are only registered with the federal ministry include, for instance, the Democratic League of Kosovo, Socialist Party of Yugoslavia, the Alliance of Yugoslav Citizens, Movement for Unification of Serbia and Montenegro, Yugoslav Democratic Party of Good Will, Movement of Yugoslav Perspective, and so on.

The large number of registered parties (198) is the result of a relatively simple registration procedure. All that is needed is the signatures of 100 members and a number of documents (statute, program). Neither the Justice Ministry nor anyone else cares whether the registered party continues to exist and whether it still has the necessary 100 members a few years later.

Most of our parties do not run in the elections, although they are registered. Some 45 parties took part in the republican elections in Serbia in 1992, while 38 parties and seven coalitions took part in the 1993 extraordinary elections. Potential voters have not even heard about most of the parties on the list, although it can be

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assumed from their names that some of these parties rally a large number of members and followers. Among these are those called: The Movement for Unification..., Movement for Protection..., Alliance of Free..., Alliance of All..., Pan-Serbian...., and the like.

We asked some of these parties' founders (their telephone numbers are registered in the ministries) whether their organizations were still operating. In several cases, the people we spoke to were more than surprised by the mention of a party that "has long been defunct," that is, that "has been disbanded." Why have the founders not removed their parties from the ministry list? The reply we were given was that they did not consider it to be important. There are, however, several not widely known local parties that have not died but are waiting for new municipal elections.

Experts think that such a large number of parties is normal for party systems that are only in the process of being formed. One should also distinguish between relevant and irrelevant as well as between institutionalized and uninstitutionalized parties. In one of the studies on this issue, Dr. Vladimir Goati wrote that a party can be considered institutionalized if it has taken part in national elections more than three times. After that, it is not likely to disappear from the political scene.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Receives UN Special Representative

LD2802160396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1315 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 28 Feb (TANJUG) — Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, today received a farewell visit from Kofi Annan, the UN secretary general's special representative, Milosevic's office has announced. [passage omitted] It was stressed in the talks that the peace process is being implemented successfully with the prospect of more rapid and comprehensive consolidation of the political circumstances in the Balkan region.

President Milosevic acknowledged the efforts of the United Nations and stressed the importance of full coordination of the undertakings of the international community aimed at the normalization of life, particularly the economic recovery of the region affected by civil war, as prerequisites for the consolidation of peace and establishment of stable, good-neighborly relations between the states and peoples in the region.

Both sides expressed the view that the removal of the imposed barriers to unhindered establishment and development of economic ties and cooperation would bring more rapid economic and cultural integration between the Balkan countries in keeping with the contemporary trends of integration in the world.

Also taking part in the talks was Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Milan Milutinovic.

Serbia: Annan Calls Talks With Milosevic 'Constructive'

AU2802203896 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 28 Feb 96

[Statement by Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali's special envoy, after talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade on 28 February; Annan speaks in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Annan, how would you assess talks with President Milosevic?

[Annan] They were very useful and constructive talks. We discussed a wide range of topics, the development of the situation in the region, mutual recognition between the countries in the region, the eventual normalization of life in the region, and the implementation of the peace agreement in Bosnia and eastern Slavonia. I was very, very pleased with the talks, although, of course, I came to pay a farewell visit as I have finished my four-month tour in the region. I came for a very specific reason, that is, to secure the transfer from the United Nations to the Implementation Force, the transfer from the military aspect of peace implementation, and to restructure the UN forces in the region.

When I leave, we shall have six various offices here: the operations in Bosnia, eastern Slavonia, and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. We shall, moreover, have two liaison offices, one in Zagreb and one in Belgrade; we shall monitor regional developments, and inform New York about events. Of course, we also have UN observers in Prevlaka. Although we do not have any military operations in Bosnia, we are nevertheless very involved in political reconciliation in the region. We shall continue with this.

[Unidentified correspondent] Who will be your successor?

[Annan] There will be no successor. I am coordinating all activities in former Yugoslavia. The six missions that I have just mentioned will report directly to New York. I am going back to New York to take over my old post as assistant to the Secretary General for peace operations worldwide. In this sense I will continue to be present in the region and in the implementation of the peace process.

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Serbia: Novi Sad Businesses Welcome End to Sanctions

AU2802203496 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The long-awaited news on the suspension of the sanctions against the Serb Republic [RS] caused great delight in Novi Sad, particularly among the businessmen, who see in this act a great chance for business.

The suspension of the sanctions against the Serb Republic is a sign for the oil refinery in Novi Sad to begin cooperation with the oil refineries in [Bosanski] Brod and Modrica. According to the director of the research and development sector (?Borislav Mandebada), the Novi Sad refinery is prepared to transfer certain production (?plants) to the Serb Republic.

The manager of Pobeda-Armature (?Bogdan Pereula) expects that establishment of full cooperation with [name indistinct] from Bileca and foundry and mint [name indistinct] from Banja Luka will soon take place.

Neoplanta meat packing and canning industry sees the suspension of sanctions as the crucial chance for market expansion, while, according to (?Smilja Natkovic) of Neoplanta, this organization will try to employ their former workers and members of their families who stayed in the Serb Republic.

"We will be able to operate normally with the corresponding companies in the Serb Republic, and we will also intensify the cooperation with (?Broilercommerce) from [word indistinct] and (?Vespromet) from Prnjavor, with which we never completely stopped cooperating even during the war," said the manager of the Zivinarstvo (?poultry cooperative).

Montenegro

Montenegro: PM To Open Economic Exhibit in Milan

LD2802215596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2020 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Feb 28 (TANJUG) — A Montenegrin political and economic delegation headed by Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic left Wednesday for for a three-day visit to Milan, capital of Italian region of Lombardy.

Montenegrin economic potentials will be presented in Milan at an exhibition 'Investire Nel Montenegro' (Investing in Montenegro).

The delegation comprises five ministers, the director of the agency for economic restructuring and foreign investments, and the president of the chamber of economy, as well as many directors and owners of Montenegrin companies in the sectors of wood processing, textile, leather and footwear industries, metal processing, food processing, shipping, and tourism.

Pointing out Wednesday that Montenegro offers great potentials, the Italian press writes that Montenegro is opening its doors to Europe, as it has carried out privatization and now expects foreign investments.

The press points to good prospects for investments in practically all fields — industry, agriculture, mineral exploration and above all tourism.

Some powerful businessmen from Lombardy, including members of Agnelli and Berlusconi families, intend to develop cooperation with Montenegro, the press writes.

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